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CROSS BURNING-HATE SPEECH AS FREE
SPEECH: A COMMENT ON VIRGINIA V. BLACK
Roger C. Hartley'
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty
have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people."'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article concerns the criminalization of cross burning. This act of
symbolic expression sometimes communicates hate, inspires fear of
impending bodily harm, expresses an ideology and solidarity with others,
or encompasses combinations of these. In 1991, Edward Cleary
defended a White juvenile, known in court documents as R.A.V., who
2had burned a cross on the lawn of a Black family. In that litigation,
Cleary began his oral argument to the Supreme Court by posing this
question: To what degree does abhorrence of cross burning justify
banning it?3  That question still baffles us. Establishing appropriate
boundaries for the protection of speech that can both intimidate and
express an ideology constitutes a profound challenge for a progressive
society committed to the twin goals of free expression and civil order.
4
When it was decided in 1992, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul5 became the
most recent in a line of cases, reaching back six decades, that invited the
Court to demarcate the limits of the First Amendment's protection for
+ Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 378-79 (1992).
3. See Transcript of Oral Argument, RAY. (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL 636263, at *3.
Petitioner's oral argument to the Court in the R.A. V. case began with the observation:
Each generation must reaffirm the guarantee of the First Amendment with
the hard cases. The framers understood the dangers of orthodoxy and
standardized thought and chose liberty.
We are once again faced with a case that will demonstrate whether or not
there is room for the freedom for the thought that we hate, whether there is
room for the eternal vigilance necessary for the opinions that we loathe.
Id.
4. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204, 217-18 (1972) (explaining that this challenge arises at least in part because protecting
freedom of expression sometimes conflicts with government's prerogative and duty to
enact laws designed to deter and punish threats of substantial harm to another).
5. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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hate speech in general and "true 'threat[s]"' in particular.6 As it had so
often in the past, the Court in R.A.V. avoided the most difficult First
Amendment questions.' Indeed, for half a century the Court has resisted
confronting the web of constitutional and political complexity hate
speech creates-that is, until its 2003 decision in Virginia v. Black."
Through five separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority,
the Court in Black upheld in part and struck down in part the Virginia
ban on cross burning with an intent to intimidate.9 While hardly a model
of clarity, the decisions in Black provide our best understanding yet of
the constitutional protection accorded hate speech.
The oral argument in Black has been described as "the justices
engag[ing] in an intense debate, interrupting each other in a frenzy of
6. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952), were the two most important early cases. Subsequently, questions
regarding the constitutional protection afforded hate speech and threats have arisen
frequently in varying contexts. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993)
(upholding a penalty-enhancement hate-crime law applicable to conduct unrelated to
expression); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380, 388 (declaring in dictum that "threats of violence are
outside the First Amendment" but holding unconstitutional a local ordinance banning
certain symbolic speech, including cross burning, when done with the knowledge that such
conduct would "'arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender"' due to the ordinance's content discrimination); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-92 (1987) (stating that a threat against the President is not
protected speech but a public employee is engaged in protected speech when expression of
desire that next assassination attempt on President Reagan be successful was made in
private and in context of speaker not intending or able to take action consistent with
expressed desire); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977)
(holding that the First Amendment shields marching, walking, or parading in uniforms
displaying the swastika); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (stating in dicta
that the First Amendment permits a state to ban "'true threat[s]." but speech at issue
found to be "political hyperbole" and not a "true threat"').
7. In RA. V, the ordinance banned certain symbolic speech, including cross burning,
when done with the knowledge that such conduct would "'arouse[] anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' 505 U.S. at
380. Although the ordinance had been interpreted as limited to "fighting words," it
nevertheless was unconstitutional because it discriminated by criminalizing content-based
subclasses of otherwise proscribable speech. Id. at 380-91; see discussion infra notes 111-
14 and accompanying text. By dispatching the ordinance on this basis, the Court in R.A. V.
avoided reaching the complex question of what if the ordinance had not so discriminated?
8. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996). It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall
violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony [punishable
by jail time and a heavy fine].
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.
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questions and commentar[ies]."' ° Solomon-like, the Court in the end
pursued a middle course in Black. It upheld Virginia's right to
criminalize cross burning on the property of another with an intent to
intimidate," but struck down a provision in Virginia law that made the
act of cross burning prima facie evidence of such an intent. The mass
media has endorsed this as a "sensible balancing act."' 3 Civil liberties
organizations have praised the decision as "str[iking] the right balance,
protecting 1st Amendment values and purely expressive conduct, while
also allowing the government to protect its citizens."' 4 Even the attorney
who represented the accused in Black concluded that "'this is a sound
compromise that a substantial part of the country, and maybe a majority,
can accept.""..5 I advance a different view of Black in this Article. I argue
that the decision represents a commendable but ultimately flawed effort
to balance the interests at stake in regulating cross burning.
Those, like me, who would find fault with Black easily could miss the
decision's many virtues. First, Black raises a staunch defense of the
Constitution's protection of unpopular viewpoints, even when they may
inflict psychic pain. 6 The Court rejected the notion that cross burning
can have but one intent-the intent to intimidate-recognizing that cross
burning sometimes is engaged in to communicate an ideology, albeit an
ideology of hate. The Constitution protects the expression of that
ideology by operation of the "bedrock principle" that government never
may censor speech simply because of society's abhorrence of the ideas
expressed."' By upholding the right to express any viewpoint, including
10. See Patty Reinert, High Court Upholds Cross-Burning Ban, HOUS. CHRON., Apr.
8, 2003, at IA, available at 2003 WL 3250609. During oral argument, Justice Thomas gave
what has been characterized as an "exasperated outburst" when he presented "an
impassioned tutorial on the history of cross burnings and sham[ed] a government lawyer
for underestimating their significance." Id.
11. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
12. Id. at 364-65.
13. See Cross-Burning Ban, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 9, 2003, at A12, available at
2003 WL 4080230.
14. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Limits Ban on Burning of Crosses: As
Scare Tactic, No; At Rallies, Yes, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL
18165827 (quoting John Whitehead, President of the Rutherford Institute, a Virginia-
based civil liberties group).
15. See Stephen Henderson, Supreme Court Upholds Virginia Cross-Burning Ban,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Apr. 8, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 18321811
(quoting Professor Rodney Smolla).
16. See 538 U.S. at 358.
17. Id. at 356-57.
18. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
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one as appalling to most of us as the viewpoint of racism and White
supremacy, Black may have struck a blow at the aged dictum in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire9 and Beauharnais v. Illinois20 that the First
Amendment provides no protection to speech that "by [its] very
utterance inflict[s] injury."21 How serious a blow Black struck warrants
22
close examination.
Moreover, Black deserves commendation for its implicit reaffirmation
of the speech-protective principle that even when speech can be
regulated because it creates a substantial evil such as intimidation, the
state may not suppress it merely because it has that tendency. The
speaker must intend that result.2 3  This confirmation of the intent
precondition to the criminalization of the content of speech replenishes a
fundamental First Amendment principle that was hard-fought and, as is
true of so many First Amendment freedoms, always is vulnerable to
dilution.
Finally, the Black decision deserves a hearty "well done" for its
rejection of Virginia's attempt to satisfy its burden of proving intent to
intimidate by making cross burning prima facie evidence of such intent.25
This holding checks an effort to introduce a "shortcut, 26 that, if
permitted, would have eroded the efficacy of the constitutional
protection the intent requirement is designed to provide.
Yet no friend of the First Amendment ought to breathe easily after
reading this decision. The middle ground staked out by Black may
initially appear appealing. After all, the decisions in Black hold "merely"
that Virginia (and her sister states) now may criminalize cross burning
intended to intimidate; that intent to intimidate "means to communicate
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to
a particular individual or group of individuals";2 that the state must
prove this intent; and that the jury may not infer such an intent simply
19. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
20. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
21. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
22. See discussion infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text,
23. See discussion infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
24. See Nat Hentoff, Introduction to EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING
CROSS, at xviii, xviii (1994) ("There have been victories from time to time protecting
freedom of speech, but there are always those -legislators, public officials, school boards,
and indignant citizens-ready and eager to cut down the First Amendment, so the fight
has to be waged over and over again.").
25. 538 U.S. at 364.
26. See id. at 367.
27. See discussion infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
28. 538 U.S. at 359.
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from the act of burning a cross.29 What's not to like about a statute that
sends people to prison and fines them only if they burn a cross on the
property of another with an intent to intimidate when the state has the
burden to prove that intent? Where is the mischief?
Mischief can be found first in the Court's willingness in Black to
uphold Virginia's choice to single out for regulation an act of symbolic
expression that carries a particular message when Virginia had available
to it wholly adequate, less restrictive, content-neutral options that it
chose not to employ.3° The Court concluded that cross burning is "'a
symbol of hate' ' 31 that a state may single out for selective proscription
but only because its long historical use as a tool of intimidation has
established it as "a particularly virulent form of intimidation. 32 Left for
another day are the questions of what other symbols may a state so
selectively regulate and what standards ought to be employed to
determine whether they too are "a particularly virulent form of
intimidation."33  These questions will arise, for example, when the
swastika, the Confederate flag, the Star of David, a picture of a fetus, or
a raised clenched fist is next singled out for selective proscription. 4
Second, the decision in Black is unconvincing because there remains a
real and substantial danger that the decision inadequately protects
against the punishment of unpopular views. There is a great risk that our
fully justified collective abhorrence of the viewpoint of racism, bigotry,
and expressions of White supremacy (the prevalent views cross burning
expresses) will lull us into accepting the compromise the Court crafted in
Black. That abhorrence makes it all too easy to look the other way and
believe that, in actual operation, the decision in Black will not create an
unacceptable risk that police in fact will arrest and juries in fact will
convict ideological cross burners having no intent to intimidate anyone.
But there is scant basis for such confidence. In this Article, I
demonstrate that there remains an unacceptably high probability that
unsympathetic juries will find an intent to intimidate in criminal trials of
those who have no intent other than to communicate through the act of
cross burning views that most jurors will find reprehensible. Our better
nature, that part of us that permits us to take the long view, knows we
29. See id. at 366.
30. For adequate alternatives to content-based selective proscription, see discussion
infra note 97.
31. 538 U.S. at 357 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 771 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
32. Id. at 363.
33. Id.
34. See discussion infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
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must examine honestly, and understand completely, how Black creates
excessive risks of viewpoint retaliation. 5
In short, there is much to admire in the Black decision as well as much
to criticize. In the following discussion, I explain why in more detail.
I. CROSS BURNING GENERATES THREE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
On the evening of August 22, 1998, Barry Black led a peaceful Ku
Klux Klan rally in Cana, Virginia (Carroll County) in an open field on
private property with permission of the owner, who was in attendance.
Between twenty-five and thirty people attended the rally, which could be
seen from a Virginia state highway, 300 to 350 yards away, over which
forty to fifty cars traveled during the time the rally was held. 37 There are
eight or ten houses in the vicinity of the open field on which the rally was
held, and from at least one the rally could be observed.38 During this
rally, some attendees gave speeches that contained White supremacy
viewpoints.3 9 There was negative talk about Blacks and Mexicans. 40 Bill
and Hillary Clinton were criticized for their part in directing tax money
41for the benefit of Black people. One speaker stated he would "'love to
take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks. ' '42 At the end of the
rally, the group circled around a twenty to thirty foot cross which was
then burned as the Klan played "Amazing Grace" over the
loudspeakers.43
The county sheriff had been on the state road observing all of this."
Not until the cross was burned did he enter the property.45 He arrested
Barry Black, informing him, "'[T]here's a law in the State of Virginia that
you cannot burn a cross and I'll have to place you under arrest for
35. See discussion infra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
36. Black, 538 U.S. at 348. A county sheriff who monitored the rally "testified that
there were no overtly threatening gestures or signs" by the rally participants. Brief on
Merits for Respondents at 2, Black (No. 01-1107). Nor did he observe any weapons. Id.
37. Black, 538 U.S. at 348-49.
38. Id. at 348.
39. Id. at 348-49.
40. Id. at 349.
41. Id.
42. Id. (alteration in original).
43. Id. Klan cross burnings often begin with a prayer and the singing of the hymn
"Onward Christian Soldiers" and, following the lighting of the cross, end with the
attendees pointing their raised left arm toward the burning cross and singing "The Old
Rugged Cross." See id. at 356.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 349.
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this."'' 46 Black was convicted of violating Virginia's cross-burning statute
and fined $2,500. 4' The jury was instructed that "'intent to intimidate
means the motivation to intentionally put a person or a group of persons
in fear of bodily harm.' 48 The jury was further instructed that "'the
burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may
infer the required intent.'
49
On May 2, 1998, Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara burned (rather
attempted to burn) a cross in the yard of James Jubilee, an African-
American and Elliott's next-door neighbor in Virginia Beach, Virginia 9
Neither Elliott nor O'Mara was affiliated in any way with the Klan.51
Jubilee had just four months earlier moved his family from California to
51
this home in Virginia Beach. Sometime prior to the cross burning,
Jubilee had heard the sound of gunshots coming from Elliott's property. 3
He went to the Elliott home to inquire, and Elliott's mother explained
that shooting firearms was Elliott's hobby and he used the back yard as a
firing range. 4 In order to "get back" at Jubilee for complaining to his
mother concerning Elliott's use of his backyard as a firing range, Elliott,
O'Mara, and a third unnamed person drove a truck onto Jubilee's
property, placed a cross twenty feet from Jubilee's house, and set it
afire.55 The cross only partially burned, and apparently the activity was
not noticed by anyone in the Jubilee household at the time because, as
the Court found, only the next morning, as Jubilee was pulling his car out
of the driveway, did he "notice[] the partially burned cross."56 Jubilee
expressed distress at seeing this partially burned cross, because he
"'didn't know what would be the next phase' and because "'a cross
burned in your yard ... tells you that it's just the first round."' 7
46. Id. The sheriff was mistaken. Virginia law barred not all cross burning but only
cross burning with the intent to intimidate. See discussion supra note 9. This critical
distinction apparently was lost on this local law enforcement official.
47. Black, 538 U.S. at 350.
48. Id. at 349.
49. Id.






56. Id.; see also Brief on Merits for Respondent at 3, Black (No. 01-1107) ("No one in
the Jubilee family actually witnessed the burning of the cross.").
57. Black, 538 U.S. at 350. Newspaper accounts reported much distress in the Jubilee
household following this cross-burning incident.
James [Jubilee], the father, paced the halls of his Virginia Beach house at night
with his gun nearby. His wife, Susan, ceased early-morning walks and recalled
movie scenes featuring KKK rallies. Their 8-year old boy was given security
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1
Elliott and O'Mara were convicted of violating the Virginia cross-
burning statute (actually attempted cross burning).58 Each was sentenced
to ninety days in jail and a $2,500 fine. 9 The jury was never instructed as
to what "intimidate" means.60 Nor was the jury told, as was the jury in
Barry Black's case, that the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient
evidence from which the jury could infer the requisite intent to
intimidate.6'
The Virginia Supreme Court consolidated these three criminal
convictions and ruled (three justices dissenting) that the Virginia cross-
burning statute was unconstitutional on its face for two independent62
reasons. First, because the statute does not prohibit all acts engaged in
with the intent to intimidate, but rather "selectively chooses only cross
burning because of its distinctive [racist] message," the statute "is
analytically indistinguishable, 63 from an ordinance the Supreme Court
had held unconstitutional in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.64 Second, in any
event, the statute is unconstitutional because it permits the jury to infer
61the intent to discriminate simply from the fact that one burned a cross.
This creates an unacceptable risk that persons who burn crosses with no
intent to intimidate will get convicted.66
protection during recess. Susan explained the psychology at work: "We didn't
know who did it. We didn't know if it was an organized hate group or just kids.
We didn't know if this was a warning that we had to get out or they were going to
firebomb our house in the middle of the night." And James elaborated: "I had
never, ever in my life encountered anything of the sort. All I knew, from what I
had been told, is that when something like that occurred, something worse was
coming."
Bruce Fein, Is Cross Burning Ever Free Speech?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at A17,
available at 2003 WL 7709452 (republishing, in part, a story previously reported in The
Washington Post).
58. Black, 538 U.S. at 350-51.
59. "The penalty for a violation included up to five years in prison." Brief of
Petitioner, Black (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898, at *23 n.13 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §
18-349.4 (Michie 1952)). Half the jail time and $1000 of the fine were suspended for
O'Mara, who pleaded guilty but reserved the right to challenge the Virginia cross-burning
statute on free speech grounds. Black, 538 U.S. at 350.
60. Black, 538 U.S. at 351.
61. Id.
62. See Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), affd in part, vacated in
part, and remanded sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
63. Id. at 742, 744.
64. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional, because of content
discrimination, ordinance banning certain symbolic speech, including cross burning, done
with the knowledge that such conduct would "arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender").
65. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 746.
66. See id.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The Court splintered into four blocs. First, Justice O'Connor,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens and Breyer, wrote the
plurality "Opinion of the Court" concluding that the First Amendment
protects cross burning when there is no intent to intimidate, that the state
may criminalize cross burning that is intended to intimidate, but Virginia
could not use the act of burning a cross as prima facie evidence of such
67
an intent. An opinion written by Justice Souter, and joined by Justices
Kennedy and Ginsberg, argued for striking down virtually any law that
singled out cross burning for regulation because such laws entail
61impermissible content discrimination. Justice Thomas, dissenting,
argued to uphold the entire Virginia cross-burning statute on the ground
that it does not implicate First Amendment issues since it "prohibits only
conduct, not expression. 69 Justice Scalia, charting yet a fourth course,
agreed with the plurality opinion that the First Amendment offers
different protections for burning a cross depending on whether it is done
to express a viewpoint or to intimidate. Justice Scalia, agreeing with the
plurality to uphold the substantive terms of the Virginia statute,
disagreed with the plurality with respect to the prima facie treatment
Virginia had assigned to cross burning, concluding that Virginia could
make the act of cross burning prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate. °
III. CLEARING AWAY THE BRUSH: IS THE REGULATION OF CROSS
BURNING THE REGULATION OF THE CONTENT OF SPEECH?
Constitutional analysis of efforts to regulate expressive conduct such as
cross burning proceeds through three levels. It must be determined
initially whether the nonverbal act of cross burning is speech. 1 If yes, the
scope of judicial review of the state's regulation of it is established by
examining whether Virginia's interest in regulating cross burning is
67. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363, 367. Justice Stevens wrote a short concurring opinion
stating that "[cross burning with 'an intent to intimidate' . . unquestionably qualifies as
the kind of threat that is unprotected by the First Amendment .... [T~hat simple
proposition provides a sufficient basis for upholding the basic prohibition in the Virginia
statute even though it does not cover other types of threatening expressive conduct." Id.
at 368 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 380-81 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
69. Id. at 394-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 368, 370 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion with respect to the
prima facie implications Virginia had assigned to the act of cross burning. Id. at 368.
71. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974).
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related to the expressive content of the act. 2 The resolution of these
issues ushers in the third step of applying the appropriate constitutional
standard to the facts.
It might be useful initially to clear away the brush in the sense of
disposing of the first two questions fairly quickly-is cross burning
speech and if so is Virginia's criminalization of it the regulation of the
content of speech? We need not linger over these questions because
well-established First Amendment principles readily demonstrate that
the Virginia statute regulates the content of speech-as eight of the
members of the Court in Black concluded.73 Yet it would not do to skip
this inquiry altogether since Virginia strenuously argued the content-.• 74
neutrality of its legislation, and Justice Thomas voted to uphold the
Virginia cross-burning statute on the ground that it regulates conduct,
not speech.75
The nonverbal act of cross burning is speech that implicates First
- 76
Amendment considerations. In Spence v. Washington, the Court
advanced a two-part test for determining when nonverbal conduct
• 71
constitutes speech. Perhaps because cross burning had been established
as symbolic speech in R.A. V.,78 none of the decisions in Black explicitly
evaluated each prong of this two-part test. The Black plurality opinion
of the Court did review extensively the history of cross burning, however,
concluding that "the burning of a cross is symbolic expression. The
reason why the Klan burns a cross at its rallies, or individuals place a
burning cross on someone else's lawn, is that the burning cross represents
the message that the speaker wishes to communicate. 79 In either case,
"the burning of a cross is a 'symbol of hate. '"'8 "[W]hile a burning cross
does not inevitably convey a message of intimidation, often the cross
burner intends that the recipients of the message fear for their lives. And
72. See O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (stating that courts must
inquire into whether the state's interest is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression").
73. 538 U.S. at 347-48, 368, 380-81.
74. See Brief of Petitioner, Black (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898, at *1.1-17.
75. Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. 418 U.S. 405 (1974),
77. Id. at 410-1. As refined in subsequent litigation, the test entails an inquiry into
the intent and context of the non-verbal activity: "[Wihether '[an intent to convey a
particularized message was present and [whether] the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."' Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
404 (1989) (alterations in original) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
78. See 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
79. Black, 538 U.S. at 360; accord id. at 354 (concluding that cross burning has "been
used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology").
80. Id. at 357 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 771 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
[Vol. 54:1
2004] Hate Speech as Free Speech: A Comment on Virginia v. Black 11
when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more
powerful."'" Cross burning is an act of symbolic speech, and no member
of the Court thought otherwise.
But did Virginia's criminalization of this nonverbal speech, when
engaged in with the intent to intimidate, constitute the regulation of the
content of speech? On this answer rides the standard of judicial review
for determining the constitutionality of Virginia's cross-burning statute.
82
Ever since United States v. O'Brien,83 the established method for
determining whether the regulation of expressive symbols warrants strict
judicial scrutiny has required an inquiry into whether the government's
regulatory interest is "[r]elated to the suppression of free expression.
Virginia argued that since "the interest asserted by Virginia is preventing
an egregious form of intimidation" and since intimidation is not a form of
free expression, "[s]uch an interest is not related to the suppression of
free expression. 8 5 Justice Thomas, alone on the Court, endorsed a close
variation of this argument. He reasoned that
[i]t strains credulity to suggest that [the early 1950s Virginia]
state legislature[, which had] adopted a litany of segregationist
laws[,] self-contradictorily intended to squelch the
segregationist message [when adopting the cross-burning statute
in 1952].... It is simply beyond belief that, in passing the [cross-
burning statute], the Virginia Legislature was concerned with
anything but penalizing conduct it must have viewed as
particularly vicious.
Accordingly, this statute prohibits only conduct, not
expression.
Both Virginia's argument, and Justice Thomas's adoption of a
variation of it, share a common analytical misstep, one that John Hart
Ely warned against as early as 1975.8 Both evaluate whether the state's
interest in regulating expressive symbols is "unrelated to the suppression
of free expression" by focusing on the state's ultimate objective-
eradication of intimidation. But as Professor Ely explains:
81. Id.
82. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (holding that the regulation of the
content of symbolic expression is to be subjected to "'the most exacting scrutiny"'
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))).
83. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
84. Id. at 377.
85. Brief of Petitioner, Black (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898, at *18.
86. Black, 538 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-97 (1975).
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Restrictions on free expression are rarely defended on the
ground that the state simply didn't like what the defendant was
saying; reference will generally be made to some danger beyond
the message .... The reference [in O'Brien to a governmental
interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression]
is . . . not to the ultimate interest to which the state is able to
point, for that will always be unrelated to expression, but rather
to the causal connection the state asserts. If, for example, the
state asserts an interest in discouraging riots, the Court will ask
why that interest is implicated in the case at bar. If the answer
is .. . that the danger was created by what the defendant was
saying, the state's interest is not unrelated to the suppression of
free expression within the meaning of O'Brien[] . . . . The
critical question would therefore seem to be whether the harm
that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact
that the defendant is communicating, and more particularly out
of the way people can be expected to react to his message ....88
Texas v. Johnson,"9 the Court's 1989 flag-burning case, leaves no doubt
regarding the validity of Professor Ely's analysis for evaluating whether
the state's interest is related to the suppression of free expression. One
reason Texas had banned flag burning was to advance its interest in
"preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity.' 9°
That interest, the Court held, is "related 'to the suppression of free
expression' within the meaning of O'Brien"91 because the State has
"proscribe[d] particular conduct because it has expressive elements." 92
"These concerns [of Texas] blossom only when a person's treatment of
the flag communicates some message .. .."9' Johnson thus confirms, as
Professor Ely correctly explained many years previously, that the crucial
question is not the ultimate objective of the state but whether the harm
the state seeks to avert arises from the "likely communicative impact" 94
on the viewer of the expressive symbol being regulated. In Black, the
harm Virginia sought to avert by regulating cross burning-
intimidation-arose entirely from the threatening message that cross
88. Id.
89. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
90. Id. at 410.
91. Id. at 411 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
92. Id. at 406.
93. Id. at 410. The Court in Johnson also explained this same point by stating that
the O'Brien question is answered by inquiring whether the governmental interest "'is
directly related to expression in the context of activity."' Id. (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 (1974)).
94. Id. at 411.
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burning sometimes communicates. Since Virginia regulated cross
burning "because it has expressive elements," 95 its interest was related to
the suppression of the content of speech. Virginia's regulation of the
content of speech thus had to meet the "'the most exacting scrutiny."' 96
Because of this "exacting scrutiny," states desiring to regulate
nonverbal conduct because of its expressive elements face two
formidable constitutional restrictions. The first is avoiding
discrimination. In Black, Virginia did not criminalize all acts of
intimidation or even all speech engaged in with the intent to intimidate.
It chose instead to single out cross burning for regulation, a symbolic
expression that carries the particular message of hate, when Virginia had
available to it adequate, less restrictive, content-neutral options that it
chose not to employ.97 The Virginia Supreme Court held that this choice
by Virginia to single out cross burning constituted unlawful content
discrimination by operation of the principle in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.91
This issue, which dominated the litigation before the Court in Black, is
taken up next in Part IV.
But even when state regulation of symbolic expression due to its
content does not violate the R.A. V. non-discrimination principle, it must
also surmount a second hurdle - overbreadth. A criminal statute
proscribing speech suffers unconstitutional overbreadth when the
standards employed to convict create a real and substantial risk of
punishing constitutionally protected conduct. 9  The prima facie
treatment of cross burning provided for in the Virginia statute
constituted such overbreadth. This was the conclusion of both the
Virginia00° and United States Supreme Courts."1 This is discussed fully
95. Id. at 406.
96. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S, 312, 321 (1988)).
97. Instead of signaling its disagreement with the merits of the viewpoints from which
threats can spring, Virginia could have relied on general laws against arson, trespass,
assault, extortion, reckless endangerment, felony terroristic threats, vandalism, etc. None
of the briefs in Black demonstrated that there is any governmental interest underlying a
ban on cross burning that cannot be protected through such content-neutral criminal laws.
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003) (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885887, at *13-20 (discussing how the United States
protects against intimidation inflicted by cross burning through content-neutral federal
statutes). Nor need the otherwise modest penalties provided for in content-neutral
statutes deter their use to address intimidation generated by cross burning. The Court's
ruling in Wisconsin v. Mitchell permits states to enhance punishment for violation of
content-neutral statutes when motivated by racial bias. 508 U.S. 476, 479 (1993).
9& See discussion supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
99. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
100. See Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. 2001), affd in part, vacated
in part, and remanded sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
101. See Black, 538 U.S. at 367.
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below in Part V.'02 Even without the prima facie evidence provision,
however, the Virginia cross-burning statute is still overbroad in the sense
of creating a real and substantial risk of punishing those who burn a
cross-not to intimidate but to express an ideology. The Black case did
not discuss this overbreadth and that lapse represents one of its great
failings, as also discussed in Part V.1
3
IV. THE R.A. V. ISSUE: CRIMINALIZING CONTENT-BASED SUBCLASSES
OF OTHERWISE PROSCRIBABLE SPEECH
"[Equal liberty of expression," as Kenneth Karst first labeled it, is a
core First Amendment principle.'5 ' Enshrined in cases such as Police
Department v. Mosley'0 5 and Schacht v. United States,"' the equal liberty
of expression principle stands as a barrier against government ranking
"the social utility of speech. °10 7 Among other things, this prevents law
from distorting the public debate by proscribing speech on only one side
of that debate.'0
It was a violation of this equal liberty of expression principle that
brought down the cross-burning ordinance in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.'9
There, a local ordinance banned certain symbolic conduct, including
cross burning, when done with the knowledge that such conduct would
"'arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender."'. 0 Although the Minnesota Supreme
102. See discussion infra Part V.A.
103. See discussion infra Part V.B.
104. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 20-21 (1975) (arguing that "the principle of equal liberty of
expression" is inherent in the First Amendment).
105. 408 U.S. 92, 93-94 (1972) (holding that it is unconstitutional to prohibit picketing
within 150 feet of a school during school hours but exempting "'peaceful picketing of any
school involved in a labor dispute' (citation omitted)).
106. 398 U.S. 58, 60, 63 (1970) (holding that it is unconstitutional to prohibit wearing
an army uniform without authorization except in theatrical performances "if the portrayal
does not tend to discredit" the armed forces).
107. Karst, supra note 104, at 31.
108. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 227 (1983) (concluding that 'when regulation is based on the content
of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that
communication has not been prohibited "merely because public officials disapprove the
speaker's views""' (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)))); accord RAy. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.").
109. 505 U.S. at 391.
110. Id.at380.
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Court had interpreted the ordinance as limited to "fighting words,""' the
Court held the ordinance unconstitutional because it targeted only
individuals who "provoke violence" by means of speech that conveys
ideas specifically disapproved of in the law.'12 The ordinance did not
cover "[tlhose who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection with other
ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political
affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality."".. The St. Paul
ordinance in R.A.V. was unconstitutional then because it violated the
"equal liberty of expression" principle: it "impose[d] special prohibitions
on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.."
The Black case presented an opportunity to illuminate the boundaries
of the R.A.V. equality principle. The Court was presented with many
options. The Virginia Supreme Court had held that the Virginia cross-
burning statute was "analytically indistinguishable" from the St. Paul
ordinance struck down in RA."V.' Before the United States Supreme
Court, Virginia argued that its law does not handicap the expression of
particular viewpoints contrary to established First Amendment principles
barring discrimination based on the content and viewpoint of speech
because the law "applies to anyone who burns a cross with the intent to
intimidate anyone for any reason.""116 Respondents countered that a state
violates the R.A.V. non-discrimination principle when it appropriates a
particular symbol for banishment from the public discourse.117 It is not
necessary that the statute also include language that singles out particular
viewpoints." 8 To interpret R.A.V. otherwise, respondents argued, "[is]
111. See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
112. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
113. Id.
114. Id. As the Court explained, "The government may not regulate [speech] based
on hostility-or favoritism -towards the underlying message expressed." Id. at 386. This
is what St. Paul did through its ordinance. As the Court explained, "Displays containing
abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are
addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use 'fighting
words' in connection with . . . ideas [not regulated by the St. Paul ordinance] are not
covered." Id. at 391.
115. See Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742 (Va. 2001), aff d in part, vacated
in part, and remanded sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
116. Brief of Petitioner, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL
1885898, at *9; accord id. at *10 ("The statute only reaches speech that can be
constitutionally proscribed and does so with language that is contcnt-ncutral."). Later,
Virginia argued that the statute "applies to all acts of cross burning with intent to
intimidate, regardless of the views of the perpetrator. Thus, it satisfies the level of
neutrality required by this Court's precedents." Id. at *21.
117. Brief on Merits for Respondents at 3, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No.
01-1107).
118. Id.
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perilous business . . . And it is but a short step from the banning of
offending symbols such as burning crosses or flags to the banning of
offending words. A word is, after all, but a symbol itself."' 19
The Court chose to adopt none of these views. Disagreeing with
Virginia, the Court concluded that the cross-burning statute does indeed
make content-based distinctions within the category of proscribable
speech (here, intimidating or threatening expression). 2" Cross burning,
the Court reasoned, does carry a distinctive, but not necessarily racist,121
message. Whether used to intimidate or as "a potent symbol[] of
shared group identity and ideology,"'22 "the burning of a cross is a
'symbol of hate.", 23 By singling out this "symbol of hate" for selective
treatment, Virginia has selected a symbol with particular content from
the field of all proscribable expression meant to intimidate. This
constitutes content-based (subject matter-based) discrimination within
the meaning of the R.A. V. decision. 24 But also disagreeing with both the
Virginia Supreme Court and the respondents, the Court held that this
content-based (subject matter-based) discrimination does not violate the
R.A.V. equality principle.'25  This is because the long history of
employing cross burning as a tool of intimidation has established cross
burning as "a particularly virulent form of intimidation.' ' 26  Selective
regulation of cross burning is thus permissible, the Court concluded,
because the regulation falls within the so-called "particularly virulent"• -• 127
exception to the R.A.V. equality principle.
119. Id. at 11.
120. Black, 538 U.S. at 347-48.
121. The Court pointed out that cross burning is used to express hate and intimidation
by persons other than members of the Ku Klux Klan. See id. at 360. Moreover, the Klan
has directed its cross burning to persons other than racial minorities. Early on, "[t]he
Klan's victims included blacks, southern whites who disagreed with the Klan, and
'carpetbagger' northern whites." Id. at 353. In more recent times, the Klan has used cross
burning against a union leader on the eve of a union election and otherwise against
anyone engaging in behavior "deemed antithetical to its goals." Id. at 355.
122. Id. at 356.
123. Id. at 357 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753,771 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
124. The best evidence, perhaps, that the Court understood the Virginia statute as
employing content discrimination within the meaning of R.A.V. is that, otherwise, there
would have been no need to save the statute from the R.A.V. rule by deploying an
exception to that rule. See discussion infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
125. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
126. Id.
127. In R.A.V., the Court acknowledged that some content discrimination among
various subcategories within a class of proscribable speech does not raise the specter of
government effectively driving certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. 505 U.S.
377, 387-88 (1992). As an example, the Court posited that the federal government lawfully
could prohibit threats directed against the President "since the reasons why threats of
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One wonders how the Court will cabin this "particularly virulent"
exception to avoid having it consume the R.A. V. rule. What other
powerful expressive symbols may be regulated selectively without
violating R.A. V. because they too are a "particularly virulent" example
of some category of speech that is proscribable? What are the principled
bases for determining "particularly virulent"? From whose point of
view? One is reminded of the Court's observation in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette,28 that "[a] person gets from a symbol the
meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is
another's jest and scorn."'25 Black left all of these questions for another
day, that day when government chooses the next symbol for selective
regulation. 30
One might be more inclined to excuse the Court for adding yet another
level of uncertainty to First Amendment theory if it had no better option.
But it did. In fact it had two.
First, R.A. V.'s exceptions apply, if at all, only if the statute in question
does not discriminate based on viewpoint.' The Court in Black went to
great lengths to demonstrate that while the statute there should be
understood as content (subject matter) discrimination, it did not1 .. . . 132
constitute viewpoint discrimination. That conclusion, however, suffers
violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force when applied to the
person of the President. But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those
threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities." Id. at 388
(citation omitted). The Court in Black excused Virginia's content-based discrimination
based on similar reasoning. Cross burning constitutes such a "particularly virulent" form
of intimidation that its proscription does not raise the specter of government choosing
sides in a viewpoint debate. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
128. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
129. Id. at 632-33. This absence of principled bases for drawing lines on what speech
to suppress struck the Court in Cohen v. California as a sufficient reason to abandon the
task since "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
130. Kenneth Karst's discussion of Justice Brennan's willingness to agree that
obscenity enjoys no constitutional protection may also help explain the Court's decision in
Black to dispose of the case through the "particularly virulent" exception. Karst has made
the insightful observation that in the 1957 obscenity litigation, Justice Brennan traded
away some First Amendment protection by defining obscenity outside the protection of
the First Amendment, and "[i]f he assumed that the courts would allow some regulation of
literature in the name of preserving public morals, the strategy [of trading away some 'low
value' speech in order to preserve other forms of speech] was plausible." Kenneth L.
Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 141-42 (1990). A similarly plausible argument can be made that
deployment of the "particularly virulent" exception in Black represents a pragmatic
response to the reality of strong societal demands, and demands within the Court, that the
states be accorded some degree of autonomy to regulate cross burning.
131. 505 U.S. at 390 n.6.
132. See Black, 538 U.S. at 355 (stating that the Klan burned a cross in front of a union
leader's home and directed cross burning to threaten anyone "deemed antithetical to its
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from a fatal non sequitur. The Court argues that Virginia does not
engage in viewpoint discrimination because "it is not true that cross
burners direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious
minorities." '33  That may be, but this is immaterial to the question of
whether a cross-burning ban regulates viewpoint. The proper question is
whether cross burning conveys such a sufficiently particularized point of
view that regulating it is the functional equivalent of regulating
viewpoint.1 3 ' The Court's non sequitur conveniently avoids its having to
address this question. But the answer seems clear. Cross burning is not
like wearing a black armband, which may communicate any one of a
thousand viewpoints. It strains credulity to deny that the message of hate
that cross burning communicates is other than hate based on the
goals"); accord id. at 362-63 (stating that "as a factual matter it is not true that cross
burners direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities" and citing
examples of "cross burnings directed at union members" and a cross burning by a
"defendant... in the yard of the lawyer who had previously represented him and who was
currently prosecuting him" and also conjecturing that "in the case of Elliott and O'Mara, it
is at least unclear whether the respondents burned the cross due to racial animus").
133. Id. at 362.
134. The Court did obliquely suggest that the viewpoint expressed by cross burning
may not always be the viewpoint of racial intolerance. The Court's lead opinion includes
the conjecture that
in the case of Elliott and O'Mara, it is at least unclear whether the respondents
burned a cross due to racial animus ... [since Elliott and O'Mara] "were angry
that their neighbor had complained about the presence of a firearm shooting
range in the Elliott's yard, not because of any racial animus."
Id. at 363 (quoting Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 753 (Va. 2001) (Hassell, J.,
dissenting), affid in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub noma. Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343 (2003)). This extraordinary assertion requires one to believe that Elliott and
O'Mara, two White teenagers who had been drinking beer at a party, would have burned a
cross in the yard of their neighbor to protest his complaining about the backyard shooting
range even if that neighbor had been White. Very few persons, one strongly suspects,
would care to gamble their ability to earn a living by being paid for each American that
could be persuaded to agree with that conclusion. By choosing the burning cross, rather
than, for example, a brick through the living room window, these two White boys were
communicating a protest to their Black neighbor regarding his complaining that included
some message reminding the neighbor that he was Black and they were White. This type
of reminder of relative racial status is exactly what White supremacy is all about.
But the absurdity of the suggestion that racial animus was absent in Elliott and
O'Mara's cross burning is exceeded only by the implicit legal principle the assertion
suggests-that the regulation of an expressive symbol that is closely associated with a
particular point of view is not viewpoint regulation if there is any evidence that the symbol
sporadically has been used to express any other viewpoint. Such a rule creates the specter
of the Court permitting a state, desiring to suppress a particular viewpoint, to regulate
instead the predominate symbol used to convey that viewpoint and avoid a finding of
viewpoint discrimination if the state is able to show that the symbol had been used
sometime in the past to express any other idea.
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viewpoint of White, Protestant, nativist supremacy.'35 The Court's non
sequitur that focuses on the intended audience rather than on the implicit
viewpoint communicated by cross burning thus permits the Court to
avoid the dissent's unassailable argument that whether used to threaten
or used to express an ideology, cross burning involves communication
generally associated with the "particular" message of "white Protestant
supremacy." '36  Cross burning is the signature expressive act of those
advancing that viewpoint. Justice Thomas himself had come to that
conclusion prior to Black. 37  Lower courts have come to that
conclusion.'3 The Virginia Supreme Court found that the use of cross
burning as a threat of racially motivated violence precipitated enactment
of the Virginia cross-burning statute.13 9 This viewpoint focus of the
Virginia statute is further reinforced by the prima facie treatment of
cross burning, added in 1968,"0 as one amicus brief in Black explained. It
argued that
the real target of [the Virginia cross-burning statute] is all cross
burnings and the racist values they have come to symbolize. As
the court below observed, "[w]hen asked how the
135. One commentator's mocking reaction was: "Oh, please. Virginia's law was
obviously aimed at cross-burners who express particular views. That is why Virginia's
Supreme Court said it violates the First Amendment." George Will, High Court Chips
Away at Free Speech Rights, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at 37, available at 2003 WL
9548192. Akhil Reed Amar makes the point that if one thinks that an "evenhanded" rule
against cross burning targets no particular set of viewpoints, one need only consider the
congressional gag rule of the 1830s that "'evenhandedly' prevented any member from
raising the slavery issue. In practice, of course, the ban worked to disadvantage the anti-
slavery critics of the pro-slavery status quo." Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing
Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 154 (1992).
136. Black, 538 U.S. at 381 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also Cody Lowe, For Far Too Long, Klan Co-opted a Sacred
Symbol, ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 5797594 (reporting
that a White, forty years ago, as a ten year-old child, observed cross burning in Virginia
directed at some who were not racial or religious minorities but the common denominator
was "[t]hey would try to intimidate everyone who stood against them and their warped
ideas" (emphasis added)).
137. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770-71 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that a burning cross is a "symbol of hate" and a "symbol
of white supremacy").
138. See, e.g., State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C. 1993) (applying R.A.V. to
strike down a ban on cross burning and concluding that "[t]he government may not
selectively limit speech that communicates, as does burning a cross, messages of racial or
religious intolerance").
139. See Black, 553 S.E.2d at 745 (concluding that "[i]n an atmosphere of racial,
ethnic, and religious intolerance, the General Assembly acted to combat a particular form
of intimidating symbolic speech-the burning of a cross").
140. Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (reporting that "[t]he Commonwealth added the prima
facie provision to the statute in 1968").
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Commonwealth could justify the inference of intimidation
provided in the last sentence of the statute, the Commonwealth
relied upon the historical context of cross burning. '
Black thus deserves criticism for its failure to recognize the viewpoint
discrimination implicit in Virginia's decision to ban cross burning.
But even if the Court were correct not to interpret the Virginia statute
as viewpoint discrimination, it still ought not to have resolved the case by
deploying the awkward "particularly virulent" exception. The Court
need only have added to R.A. V. the limiting principle that no exception
to R.A. V. is appropriate when a state selectively regulates an expressive
symbol that is closely associated with a distinctive idea. The dissent in
Black attempted to steer such a course. The dissent argued that no
exception to R.A. V. is warranted because cross burning "may ... have
been singled out because of disapproval of its message of white
supremacy., 142 Evidence that a "communication generally [is] associated
with a particular message" can establish an undue risk of such
143
motivation. Such evidence deprives a statute of eligibility for an
exception to R.A.V. because of the unwarranted risk that the
proscription is "a ruse for message suppression"'" and too high a
probability that "'official suppression of ideas is afoot.' ' 145 The flexibility
in the dissent's view is appealing and its application to cross burning is
straightforward since cross burning is a symbolic expression of hate, as
the majority acknowledges, and it is closely associated with the viewpoint
of White, Protestant, nativist supremacy. Few symbols communicate
141. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 31085675, at
*11-12 (alteration in original) (quoting Black, 553 S.E.2d at 745). Picking up on Virginia's
reliance on the historical roots of its cross-burning statute, respondents argued that
Virginia was trying to have it both ways by arguing that cross burning is inherently
intimidating because of "cross-burning as a ritual practice of the Ku Klux Klan," but its
regulation by the State is not the regulation of the Klan's viewpoint of bigotry. Brief on
Merits for Respondents at 15, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
142. Black, 538 U.S. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
accord id. at 383-84 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that the proper inquiry is whether the threat singled out for proscription is
"generally identified by reference to the content of any [particular] message" or is "clearly
associated with a particular viewpoint").
144. Id. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992), which had stated that an exception
from the R.A.V. rule would not be appropriate unless the Court were convinced that no
"official suppression of ideas [was] afoot").
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such a singular message as does cross burning. And few are so closely
associated with a particular viewpoint. 6
One might fairly read Black's deployment of the "particularly
virulent" exception as a ticket for this day and this train only. That is, no
symbolic expression other than cross burning ever will qualify for the
exception "in light of cross burning's long and pernicious [and unique?]
history as a signal of impending violence. 1 47 The quote from Black that
likely will be found in much future litigation by those arguing to limit
Black to cross burning is the conclusion that "when a cross burning is
used to intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful.' 48 But the
counter-quote of choice may be, "[A] State [may] choose to prohibit only
those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily
harm.
, 149
It does seem clear that the Court's extensive effort to demonstrate the
unique relationship between cross burning and the threat of violence
telegraphs a commitment by at least some members of the Court not to
permit a wholesale expansion of the "particularly virulent" exception."1 0
146. Justice Thomas makes a persuasive argument that one cannot fairly conclude that
the Virginia Legislature that enacted the cross-burning statute in 1952 had in mind
suppressing the viewpoint of White. Protestant, nativist supremacy. See discussion supra
note 86 and accompanying text. That is not a sufficient reason, however, to dismiss the
dissent's claim that the Virginia statute is undeserving of any R.A. V. exception.
"'[O]fficial suppression of ideas [can be] afoot,"' not only in the motivation for legislation
but also in its administration. Symbolic expression may be singled out because of
disapproval of its message through the discretion prosecutors exercise in choosing whom
to indict and through juries in determining whether to find an intent to intimidate. For the
defendant caught up in the criminal justice system because he or she burned a cross for
ideological reasons, Justice Thomas's historical reminder of the motives of the 1952
Virginia Legistature is not reassuring.
147. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363. The Black plurality opinion of the Court reached back
to the fourteenth century in its review of the use of cross burning to communicate. It
demonstrated the signature use of cross burning by the "second Klan," which began its
activities in 1905. Id. at 352-53. It then reviewed in much detail the twentieth century use
of cross burning as a vehicle of intimidation in "the long history of Klan violence," citing a
wealth of academic literature. See id. at 354-56. In short, the opinion makes a case that
the intimidation arising from cross burning is "particularly virulent" because of the
exceptional, indeed incomparable, association of that symbol with "the history of violence
associated with the Klan." Id. at 357.
148. Id at 357 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
150. Even if Black were not extended to permit selective regulation of other
expressive symbols, the case is likely to encourage enactment of cross-burning bans. At
the time of the decision, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had enacted cross-
burning statutes. Gina Holland, Court Upholds Cross-Burning Ban, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Apr. 8, 2003, at 8A available at 2003 WL 17679147 (reporting that "[a]nti-cross
burning laws exist in California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and the District of Columbia"). Soon after the decision in Black, the Senate Judiciary
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But, it would seem naive to assume that no court will be asked to so
qualify other symbols. Thus, the question Black presents is, what
demonstration will be required before a state may appropriate another
symbol for selective regulation because that symbol also has a sufficiently
well-established association with intimidation?
The swastika is a likely candidate as the next symbol some states will
choose for selective proscription.' In the same section of the Virginia
Code that proscribes cross burning, Virginia has enacted a parallel
statute targeting swastikas.12  The ordinance struck down in R.A.V.
included swastikas within its proscription."' The popular press, which
admittedly seldom captures the nuances of Supreme Court litigation,
already has concluded that Black upholds the right of states to enact
hate-crime laws targeting those who display a swastika to terrorize
1,54
others. Even when the press avoids that mistake, it makes the case that
Committee in the State of Louisiana unanimously approved a bill introduced by a New
Orleans legislator "that would add cross burning to a law.., dealing with ... intimidation,
terrorizing, stalking, and cyberstalking." Mike Hasten, Panel OKs Bill to Ban Cross
Burning, ALEXANDRIA DAILY TOWN TALK, May 14, 2003, at 4, 2003 WL 7324001.
151. An attempt to link the holding in Black to renewed efforts to ban burning of the
American flag was reported soon after the decision in Black.
Despite a string of defeats on the issue, the House continues to favor a proposed
constitutional amendment that would prohibit burning or desecrating the
American flag. This year, the process is beginning anew, and with a renewed
fervor. Proponents are counting on the wave of patriotism both during and after
the war in Iraq to heighten their chances of success. And they are taking added
encouragement from a U.S. Supreme Court ruling last month upholding a
Virginia ban on cross burning.
The Flag and Free Speech, TIMES UNION ALBANY, Apr. 7, 2003, at A10, 2003 WL
5014052. Those who would attempt to use Black to justify a ban on flag burning are likely
to face insurmountable obstacles. They will need to demonstrate that the burning of an
American flag is uniquely associated with efforts to communicate a "particularly virulent"
form of proscribable speech. One would think that Texas v. Johnson would spell quick
defeat for such efforts since the Court there understood flag burning as a form of
nonviolent political protest. See 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (finding no risk of disturbance
arising from the peaceful flag burning in that case).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.1 (Michie 1996). Added in 1983, it provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating
another person or group of persons, to place or cause to be placed a swastika on
any church, synagogue or other building or place used for religious worship, or
on any school, educational facility or community center owned or operated by a
church or religious body....
For the purposes of this section, any such placing of a swastika shall be prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate another person or group of persons.
Id.
153. ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE tit. XXVIII, ch. 292, §§ 292.01-.03 (WESTLAW
through Council File No. 04-538, adopted June 9, 2004).
154. See David G. Savage, High Court Narrows Right to Burn Crosses, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2003, at 11A, 2003 WL 17748158 (reporting that "by a 6-3 margin the
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cross burning and displaying swastikas pose an identical intimidation
potential.5 s  The linkage between cross burning and displaying the
swastika in terms of their inherent intimidating effect is widely
accepted. 5 6  It will be recalled that in the first round of the Skokie
litigation, 7  the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that it was
unconstitutional to enjoin displaying the swastika either under the
fighting words exception to free speech or in anticipation of a hostile
reaction. 15 Thereafter, the Village of Skokie enacted new legislation
designed to suppress display of the swastika by members of the National
Socialist Party of America (NSPA).5 9 It banned the dissemination of any
materials within the Village that intentionally promotes hatred based on
race, national origin, or religion. '6  That too was found
unconstitutional.'' If Black had been decided when the Skokie
controversy raged, could the Village lawfully have banned displaying a
swastika with an intent to intimidate? If the answer is yes, one can
imagine that Skokie law enforcement officials, convinced the
demonstrators had the requisite intent to intimidate, would have had
little patience with any display of a swastika. Skokie could then have
prosecuted the demonstrators, leaving their fate to a jury made up of the
good citizens of Skokie to determine whether the requisite intent to
court upheld the hate-crime laws in states that target those who burn a cross or display a
Nazi swastika on private property to 'terrorize' residents").
155. See Bruce Fein, Is Cross Burning Ever Free Speech?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2003, at A17, available at 2003 WL 7709452. The argument advanced is that
[c]ross burning is uniquely terrifying to the black community. By legend and
experience, burning a cross came to be understood as the signature of the Ku
Klux Klan's intent to retaliate against any black who balked at white supremacy.
Indeed, as the Nazi swastika is to the Jews, cross burnings are to blacks a
frightening symbol of threatened death and destruction that chills the heart and
obsesses the mind. History speaks volumes.
Id.
156. The adults in the household that was the target of the cross burning in R.A.V.
expressed the view that "'all black people take cross-burning as a threat, just as all Jewish
people take a swastika splattered across the wall as a threat."' HENTOFF, supra note 24, at
xvi. Even today, German law "'maintains extraordinary restrictions on Nazi symbolism,
no doubt because of a fear of what would be implied by tolerance."' EDWARD J.
CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS 147 (1994) (quoting LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY 199 (1986)). The linkage between cross burning and the swastika is
made even more evident when one realizes that White supremacists themselves sometimes
wear a swastika armband. See Paul Davis, Memories of the Klan in Florida, PROVIDENCE
J., Apr. 24, 2003, at B4, available at 2003 WL 7064379 (recounting a report that David
Duke had worn a swastika armband as a student).
157. See Vill. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978).
158. Id. at 24.
159. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978).
160. See id. at 1199-1200.
161. Id. at 1207.
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intimidate had been proved. One supposes that only the most foolhardy
NSPA member, or one desiring martyrdom, would display a swastika in
Skokie under those circumstances. If that is a fair estimate, then the chill
on First Amendment freedoms is glaring. Is it not also fair to predict that
it would take a similarly foolhardy or martyrdom-seeking White
supremacist to burn a cross in any state enacting a Virginia-type cross-
burning statute, at least where the pool from which the jury is drawn is
dominated by those who believe that there is no such thing as ideological
cross burning and who despise the racist viewpoint expressed in cross
burning?
And what of the display of the Confederate flag? Anyone who resides
in the rural South, for example, can attest that many there cherish their
right to display that flag-on frames for automobile license plates, as seat
covers for trucks, in the rear windows of trucks, as decals on car bumpers
or lunch pails, in store windows, in front yards, etc. Yet that flag
carries enormous baggage as a symbol of threat, at least in the minds of
some very rational people. Indeed it often is displayed, with the
American flag, at Klan rallies that feature the burning of a cross.161
When some community in the future decides to ban display of the
Confederate flag with intent to intimidate, should not such a ban be
lawful because displaying the Confederate flag, like cross burning, is a
"particularly virulent" expression of intimidation? If the answer is yes,
imagine the consequences for other expressive symbols, such as images
of men in black jackets and dark glasses marching with fists raised in a
Black power salute. If the answer is no-states may not selectively
proscribe displaying the Confederate flag-imagine the consequences of
such an outcome if the law develops that states may ban both cross
burning and the display of the swastika with the intent to intimidate.
When the question becomes how "virulent" must the intimidating
message of a symbol be to be "particularly virulent," we invite
government line-drawing that increasingly resembles choosing sides in
the public debate.
Antiwar protestors fly the flags of countries with which we are at war.
The Viet Cong flag once was so displayed. May states now ban such flag
flying if done with the intent to intimidate?' 64 Displaying pictures of
162. The author, who resides in rural Virginia and lives there full-time following the
close of the academic year until the beginning of the next, can attest to these uses of the
Confederate flag in certain parts of Virginia.
163. See Davis, supra note 156 (reporting that at a Klan rally held in Florida: "On
stage, a strong wind whipped twin flags: American and Confederate. A hundred people
sat on metal folding chairs in the grass.").
164. We know that since 1931, it has been unconstitutional for the government to ban
the flying of a red flag. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361, 369 (1931). Such a ban
is unlikely today but "[a]t the time the [red] flag was a well-known symbol of the
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fetuses in front of health clinics offering abortion services with the intent
to intimidate is a prime candidate for proscription in states where the
current majority is "pro-choice" rather than "pro-life." Burning one in
effigy is a traditional way to intimidate the one whose effigy is burned. Is
that a sufficient nexus to intimidation to qualify for the "particularly
virulent" exception? One wonders if the State of Louisiana could have
avoided its defeat in Brown v. Louisiana1 65 if only instead of alleging
breach of the peace by those who sat silently in the "Whites only" section
of that "tiny parish branch library,"' 66 Louisiana legislators had perfected
the foresight to enact a statute prohibiting engaging in a "silent and
reproachful presence''167 in a public building "with the intent to
intimidate."
Religious symbols can be used and have been used to intimidate
members of other faiths. Muslim religious symbols may be likely
candidates for obloquy following 9/11 and the current political climate
aroused by the invasion of Iraq. Is it simply civil libertarian paranoia to
think some community would ban the display of such symbols with the
intent to intimidate? What of a similar ban on the Star of David? Or
perhaps a "twofer," a ban on both. Who can deny that a reasonably
strong historical case could be made that each symbol, in the view of
someone, has a well-established record as a symbol of intimidation?
Lest the reader believe that these examples are so beyond any likely
reality as not to be worthy of concern, perhaps the banning of the display
of the Star of David by the city council in Leeds, England, will serve as a
useful splash of cold reality. Edward Cleary recounts a report by
Professor Alan Dershowitz that "a[] . . .United Nations resolution
equating Zionism with racism had led England (specifically Leeds,
England) to ban the Star of David. 1 68 Pressure from the international
Communist party in the United States" making its display controversial. See CLEARY,
supra note 156, at 25. What if the California Penal Code that made display of the red flag
illegal had contained the additional words "with the intent to intimidate"? No symbol, a
zealous anti-communist would argue, is more associated with threat and intimidation than
flags representing communism. The historical record of intimidation wrought by
communism makes a strong case for a "particularly virulent" exception for regulating
display of the red flag. How secure is Stromberg in light of Black?
165. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
166. Id. at 163 (Black, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 142.
168. CLEARY, supra note 156, at 132. The author states that "I had participated by
telephone in a radio talk show on WBZ in Boston .... Alan Dershowitz ... noted that a
similar law [similar to the St. Paul ordinance] had been 'used in Leeds, England, a couple
of years ago to ban the Star of David as a "racist symbol" under the U.N. declaration
equating Zionism with racism"'). Id. 84-85. "[T]he General Assembly to the United
Nations [has now] repealed the offensive 1975 resolution characterizing Zionism as 'a
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community to ban speech deemed racist continues and is likely to
continue, as the careful work of Mar Matsuda makes plain. 6 9 Article
Four of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, Matsuda reports, requires signatory states "to
criminalize racial hate messages."' 7 ° It further provides that signatory
states shall
condemn all . .. organizations which are based on ideas or
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one
colour or ethnic origin ... [and s]hall declare as an offence
punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred ... [and s]hall declare illegal and prohibit
organizations ... which promote ... racial discrimination, and
shall recognize participation in such organization . . . as an
offence punishable by law. 7 '
While the Convention also recognizes the right of free expression,
Matsuda concludes that the Convention demonstrates that "the evolving
international view" is affirmative recognition of the "right to freedom
from racist hate propaganda. 1 2 Upholding the Virginia cross-burning
statute is in accord with this international view, which can be expected to
intensify the political pressure in this country to apply the "particularly
virulent" exception to criminalize at least some of the expressive symbols
discussed above.
173
V. THE OVERBREADTH ISSUES
The decision in Black rests on two holdings. First, a state may
proscribe cross burning, but only if it proves an intent to intimidate.74
Second, a state may not indulge in the "shortcut" of making the act of
cross burning prima facie evidence of such an intent.17 These holdings
warrant close examination. First, the prima facie evidence provision the
form of racism and racial discrimination' by a vote of 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions." Id.
at 132.
169. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2341-42 (1989).
170. Id. at 2341.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2342
173. See Charles Lane, Thinking Outside the U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A13
(discussing how recent decisions of the Court, such as opinions deciding the
constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally retarded criminals, affirmative action in
university undergraduate and graduate programs, and state bans on homosexual sodomy,
increasingly "reflect the influences of international legal norms, as well as rulings by courts
in foreign countries").
174. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).
175. Id. at 367.
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Court struck down created a significant split among the members of the
Court, a split that focused on what Justice Scalia argued was an
unprecedented view of First Amendment overbreadth1 76  Second,
upholding Virginia's right to ban cross burning with the intent to
intimidate merits close scrutiny because the "devil is in the details." Is
this holding sufficiently speech-protective to avoid punishment of those
who burn crosses with no intent to intimidate? Or, does there remain an
unacceptable risk that a jury may develop a penchant for finding such an
intent when the evidence of intent is equivocal but the message
communicated by the cross burning is considered reprehensible? These
matters are taken up next.
A. The Prima Facie Evidence Provision and First Amendment
Overbreadth
The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that Virginia could not
constitutionally make the act of burning a cross prima facie evidence of
an intent to discriminate because "[tihe enhanced probability of
prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected
speech." '77 The three dissenting Virginia Supreme Court justices found
no constitutional infirmity in the prima facie provision.178 Addressing the
provision's effect on the likelihood of conviction, not the enhanced risk
of being prosecuted, the dissent argued that the prima facie provision
merely creates an inference.' 79 The burden of proof remains with the
Commonwealth, and the inference alone "is clearly insufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant burned a cross with
the intent to intimidate." "o These competing arguments highlight the
two questions the prima facie provision presented the United States
Supreme Court: whether an increased risk of prosecution, rather than
conviction, can render a statute unconstitutionally overbroad, and, in any
event, whether the prima facie provision creates an unacceptable risk
that juries will erroneously convict.
The majority in Black never reached the question of whether First
Amendment overbreadth is available to redress the enhanced risk of
prosecution created by the prima facie provision. The Court found the
provision unconstitutional because it "can 'skew jury deliberations
toward conviction in cases where the evidence of intent to intimidate is
176. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
177. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. 2001), affd in part, vacated in
part, and remanded sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
178. Id. at 755 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 756 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Hassell, J., dissenting).
Catholic University Law Review
relatively weak and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason
for burning."' 81  Critical to this conclusion was a Virginia model jury
instruction. It provided that "'[tihe burning of a cross, by itself, is




This instruction was given to the jury in the criminal prosecution
involving Barry Black but not in the O'Mara or Elliott prosecutions. 83
The jury instruction constituted a ruling by the Virginia Supreme Court
on a question of state law because the Virginia Supreme Court, provided
the opportunity, chose not to disavow the jury instruction.'8 4 It rendered
the prima facie provision unconstitutionally overbroad because
[the instruction] permits a jury to convict in every cross-burning
case in which defendants exercise their constitutional right not
to put on a defense. And even where a defendant like Black
presents a defense, the prima facie evidence provision makes it
more likely that the jury will find an intent to intimidate
regardless of the particular facts of the case.
It is apparent that the provision as so interpreted 'would
create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.""5
Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented on this
point. Emphasizing agreement with the majority that the focus needs to
be on who will be convicted and not who will be prosecuted,"6 the Scalia
opinion launched four attacks on the reasoning in the opinion of the
Court regarding the prima facie provision. Justice Scalia first rejects the
claim that the provision will make it more likely that juries will find an
intent to intimidate.8 7 This, Justice Scalia argues, has no basis in fact. 88
Since the law of Virginia provides that the prima facie provision does not
relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to prove, nor the jury of its duty
181. Black, 538 U.S. at 366 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part)).
182. See id. at 364 (citation omitted) (citing VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL, Instruction No. 10.250 (1998 & Supp. 2001)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 365 (quoting Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,
965 n.13 (1984)). The Court noted that the prima facie provision permits the
Commonwealth to convict based on the act of cross burning itself and makes no provision
for distinguishing between "cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or
resentment and a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a
victim." Id. at 366. This adds to the risk of skewing jury deliberations. Id.
186. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
187. Id. n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
188. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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to determine, intent based on the whole record, Justice Scalia perceives
no skewing of the adjudicatory process. 89
Second, and in any event, Justice Scalia argued, the majority has
constructed a new "species of overbreadth doctrine .. . [and] a rare
species indeed."' 9  His claim in this regard is that the overbreadth
doctrine is concerned with the overly broad substance of law, not its
process for convicting. Inadequacies in "the process through which
elements of a criminal offense are established in a jury trial may raise
serious constitutional concerns .. .[but] such concerns sound in due
process, not First Amendment overbreadth."' 9'
Third, Justice Scalia was unimpressed that a hypothetical defendant,
choosing to exercise the constitutional right not to present a defense,
may be convicted erroneously by operation of the prima facie
provision. 92  His response is that a successful overbreadth defense
requires proof of real and substantial overbreadth "'judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."1 93 He argues that there are few
defendants who burn a cross for ideological reasons, are arrested and
prosecuted, choose not to present a defense, and are thus erroneously
convicted. 94 Concluding that the prima facie provision fails to create "'a
substantial number of impermissible applications," ' 9 5 Justice Scalia finds
that the prima facie provision is not unconstitutionally overbroad. 96
Finally, Justice Scalia calls "alarming" the use of the Virginia jury
instruction to find overbreadth. 97 He notes that the Virginia Model Jury
Instructions were not "promulgated by the Legislature nor formally
adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court."' 98 They should not, he argues,
189. Id. at 372 n.. 372-33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
190. Id. at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part)-
191. Id. at 374 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
192. id. at 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)).
194. Id. at 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982)).
196. id. at 374-75 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part)-
197. Id. at 376 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
198. Id. at 377 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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be deemed binding interpretations of state law upon which a statute can
be ruled unconstitutional due to overbreadth.' 99
Black may indeed have sired a new species of overbreadth, as Justice
Scalia claims. The decision certainly endorses the proposition that the
unacceptable risk of punishing protected speech, the concern that
energizes the overbreadth doctrine, can arise either because of a statute's
substantive terms or because of the process through which the elements
of a criminal offense are established. Justice Scalia is correct, moreover,
when he states that there was no record evidence that the prima facie
provision would skew jury deliberations. Indeed, it may be this lack of
record evidence that will help qualify Black one day for honorable
mention as a speech-protective decision. Using a jury instruction that
states that "[t]he burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from
which you may infer the required intent"""° is perilously close to telling a
jury it may disregard rebuttal evidence and convict on the basis of the act
of cross burning alone. At least this was the Court's view when it stated
that "even where a defendant . . . presents a defense, the prima facie
evidence provision makes it more likely that the jury will find an intent to
intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case.",202  So
understood, Black endorses a view of First Amendment overbreadth that
holds that a state's procedural rules must not introduce anything into a
criminal trial that a fair-minded person could view as confusing to a jury
and skewing its deliberative process . Courts are permitted, indeed
required, to use their judgment to cleanse criminal procedure of rules
that create this risk. The absence of documentation that procedural rules
do in fact create such risks of jury-process malfunction does not relieve
the judiciary of this oversight responsibility. A corollary to this vision of
First Amendment overbreadth is that procedural overbreadth is not
limited by the real and substantial overbreadth requirements that usually
restrict the use of substantive overbreadth. Black at least points in these
directions.
199. Id. at 377-78 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
200. See id. at 372-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 364 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 365.
203. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518,
518-20 (1970) (arguing that certain extraordinary procedural protections exist in our
regime for protecting free expression and must exist to secure that freedom).
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B. The Devil Is in the Details: The Continuing Risk of Punishment of
Viewpoint
Reduced to its essentials, Black proclaims to the cross burner that "you
may not be punished constitutionally for your act of cross burning if done
with the intent to express a viewpoint; you may only be punished if you
burn a cross with the intent to intimidate." This is a cynical promise
indeed if, as a practical matter, the promise of freedom of expression in
Black rings hollow because in practice prosecutors and juries can (and
likely will) blur the line between these two differently motivated acts and
routinely punish ideological cross burners. What would be most cynical,
of course, is if the threat of unwarranted prosecution and punishment so
chills constitutionally protected speech that few prosecutions are needed
since few, if any, will risk exercising their constitutional right to burn a
cross for ideological reasons in states adopting Virginia-like statutes.
There are a considerable number of "ifs" in the above observations that
need to be examined.
Black certainly needs to be commended for insisting that one may not
be punished simply because speech has a tendency to produce evils the
government has a right to protect against-such as intimidation. Black
stands as a bright beacon reconfirming that without an intent (an aim) to
intimidate, speech cannot lawfully be punished, no matter how likely the
tendency that unintended intimidation in fact will result.2 4 Anyone who
has taught constitutional law to first year law students will attest to how
counterintuitive this distinction between intent and tendency can be to
the uninitiated. The intuitive response is to equate intent and tendency
and conclude that one should be held to have intended the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of one's acts-their natural tendencies.
Only after many years of debate and more than a few false starts did
First Amendment doctrine adopt the principle that criminal
responsibility for speech requires proof of intent, rather than simply
proof of the potential "bad tendency" of speech.0 5 Since Brandenburg v.
204. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (holding that "[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat" requiring proof that "the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals"); id. at 360 (holding that a
constitutionally proscribable intimidation requires proof that a speaker "directs a threat"
to another "with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death"); see also
id. at 357 (stating that proscribable cross burning requires evidence that it was "designed to
inspire in the victim a fear of bodily harm" (emphasis added)); id. at 366 (indicating that
cross burning is proscribable when done "with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a
victim"); id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(describing the test of intent as proof of an "aim to threaten").
205. See John F. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving
Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1994) (describing the
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Ohio,"" however, requiring proof of intent and defining intent as one's
aim or desire, have attained a prominent, if not always totally secure,
place in First Amendment theory. 0 7 For example, proving malicious libel
evolution of First Amendment theory from the era when one could be convicted because
of the "bad tendency" of speech to the present era exemplified by the decision in
Brandenburg); see also William J. Burnett, Wisconsin v. Mitchell: First Amendment Fast-
Food Style, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 385, 394 (1995) (stating that in Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), "the Court clarified the clear and present danger test to
make it constitutional to ban any words which have as a 'natural tendency and reasonably
probable effect' [that] conflicts with the desires of a legislative majority" (quoting Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919))); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its
Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 516-20 (1981) (reviewing pre-World War I precedent
and concluding that First Amendment theory did not condition criminal responsibility for
speech on proof of intent; rather, the focus was on the "bad tendency" of speech). For an
example of turn-of-the-century First Amendment theory, see Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907), which upheld the validity of punishment of a truthful publication
because of its tendency to obstruct the administration of justice.
206. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
207. It was not until Brandenburg, that "the Court finally held that the 'probability of
harm' was 'no longer the central criterion for speech limitations. The inciting language of
the speaker ... is the major consideration."' CLEARY, supra note 156, at 137 (quoting
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720 (1975)).
Brandenburg held that the government may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 395 U.S.
at 447. The "directed to inciting" that the government must prove is a requirement to
prove subjective intent and not just tendency. This is clear first, because if "directed to
inciting" could be proved merely by proving tendency, that is, that harm is likely to be
incited, the Brandenburg test would be internally incoherent since the test later requires
proof that the speech at issue is "likely to incite or produce such [imminent lawless]
action." Id. Subsequent cases, moreover, make plain that "directed to inciting" is proved
by proving a subjective intent to incite. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971)
(holding that "[alt least so long as there is no showing of an intent to incite disobedience
to or disruption of the draft, Cohen could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the inutility or immorality
of the draft his jacket reflected"); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706-08 (1969)
(holding that an anti-war protestor who stated that if the army ever required him to carry
a rifle, "the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." (speaking of then President
Lyndon Johnson) cannot be punished for violating a federal statute prohibiting
threatening the life of the President because the statute's scope must be interpreted
consistent with constitutional limitations for proscribing a "'true threat"' and the totality
of the context shows that Watts lacked the requisite intent but rather engaged in "political
hyperbole"); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002)
(reaffirming that "mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning it"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-09 (1973) (striking down the
conviction of anti-war protestor who stated, "[w]e'll take the f--king street later"
because there was no evidence of intent to produce imminent disorder); Kent Greenawalt,
Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 652 (1980).
To say that someone's words are directed toward producing a result implies that
the purpose of the speaker is to produce that result and, perhaps more, that this
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in a constitutional sense requires evidence of intent.28 So also do
government regulation of advocacy of use of force or of law violation,09
the law regulating incitement of hostile audiences to reactive violence,"
and even the fighting words doctrine.21' Black now confirms that proof of
specific intent (aim) must be proved also in threat cases.2 2
The integrity of this intent requirement is compromised, however, if
juries equate intent with tendency. Confusing intent and tendency will
skew jury deliberations. A constitutionally mandated jury instruction is
needed and, indeed, is mandated by the First Amendment procedural
overbreadth principle deployed in Black to strike down the Virginia
prima facie provision.2 3 The instruction on intent needs to include an
purpose is evident in the words that he uses. So long as the speaker does not
actually intend to produce imminent lawless action, the Court's standard bars
punishment even though the speaker is fully aware that his words may provoke
illcgal action and that such action is virtually certain to follow.
Id.
208. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring proof
of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in libel actions brought by public
officials libeled with respect to conduct germane to their qualification for office); see also
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (requiring the same for public figures).
209. See supra note 207, for a discussion of Brandenburg.
210. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (holding that police may arrest
speaker whose speech arouses an audience to hostile reaction only if speaker uses
language that "passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to
riot" (emphasis added)); see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (holding that the state may not
punish an anti-war protestor for speech on the theory that the speaker incited an audience
to hostile reaction absent evidence that speaker "intentionally provok[ed] a given group to
hostile reaction"); id. at 23 (holding the same because Cohen "has not sought to provoke
[a violent] response by a hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless" (emphasis
added)).
211. The fighting words doctrine does not explicitly contain an intent requirement. It
permits regulation of speech that, as a matter of common knowledge, is inherently likely
to provoke an imminent hostile response in the person to whom the words individually are
addressed. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972). But, an intent
requirement is implicit in the elements the state must prove to proscribe speech under the
fighting words doctrine, especially the requirement that the words must be "directed to the
person of the hearer." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940). They must
constitute a "direct personal insult." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. This requirement of proving
that the speaker directed "fighting words" face-to-face to the "person of the hearer" is the
functional equivalent of requiring proof of intent; the proof establishes conditions that, as
a matter of law, demonstrate a frame of mind showing either subjective intent to produce
a violent reaction or reckless disregard that a violent reaction would result.
212. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
213. It will be recalled that the prima facie evidence provision was struck down in
Black because it "makes it more likely that the jury will find an intent to intimidate
regardless of the particular facts of the case .... It is apparent that the provision as so
interpreted 'would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas."' Id. at 365
(quoting Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965 n.13 (1984)
(quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797 (1984))).
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explicit statement that in order to find that the defendant had the
requisite intent, the jury must determine that the defendant's purpose
(aim) was to intimidate. The jury must be told that intent is not
established by proof that cross burning may have had, or did have, the
tendency or likelihood to intimidate. Failure to so instruct a jury should
be reversible error in any conviction for cross burning. Otherwise, the
promise of Black to the ideological cross burner risks being reduced to a
sham.
Such an instruction is a necessary, but not sufficient, reform to secure
the speech-protective promise of Black. The proposed instruction helps
avoid potential juror confusion with respect to the appropriate use of the
intimidating tendencies of cross burning but does not address the risk of
jury nullification. Such nullification is a real and substantial threat for
three reasons: 1) the widely held belief that the only reason one would
burn a cross is to intimidate; 2) the inherent weakness of the jury system
as a bulwark against government oppression when a cultural outsider
challenges conventional orthodoxy; and 3) the risk that the government
will introduce evidence of the tendency of cross burning to intimidate as
probative of a subjective intent to intimidate and thereby signal juries to
convict based on this tendency, notwithstanding a jury instruction to the
contrary.
With respect to the first concern, meaningful protection of the
constitutional right to engage in ideological cross burning requires that
prosecutors, judges, and juries all accept the Supreme Court's conclusion
that cross burning sometimes is engaged in not to intimidate but rather to
communicate a viewpoint. Were there to develop a widespread rejection
of that view, replaced by a belief that the only reason persons burn
crosses is to intimidate, there would be faint basis for confidence that
judges and juries would protect ideological cross burners by finding they
had no intent to intimidate.
The evidence strongly suggests the presence of a widely held belief
that the only reason one would burn a cross is to intimidate. That
explicitly was the position advanced by the State of Virginia in Black
when it argued to the Court that "[a] burning cross-standing alone and
without explanation-is understood in our society as a message of
intimidation. '[T]he pernicious message of [cross burning is] a clear and
direct expression of an intention to do one harm, [and] constitutes a true
threat.'21 4 Indeed, while the Virginia cross-burning statute gave lip
The prima facie evidence provision was unconstitutional because it created an
unacceptable risk of skewing jury deliberations. Id. at 366; see discussion supra notes 181-
85 and accompanying text.
214. See Brief of Petitioner, Black (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898, at *26 (citing
O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 179 (Va. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Black
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service to the intent requirement, Virginia's brief to the Court made
plain the Commonwealth's position that proving such an intent is not
constitutionally mandated."' Moreover, Virginia's adoption of the prima
facie evidentiary rule reveals its view that cross burning inherently• 216
manifests an intent to intimidate. Even after the decision in Black,
Virginia political officials continue to argue publicly that inherent in all
217
cross burning is the intent to intimidate. The mass media, moreover,
continues to express this view.218 Some academic literature adopts this
view.2 9 It is instructive that in the 1992 litigation in the RA.V. case,
Edward Cleary, the attorney for R.A.V., was opposed by "nearly every
major civil rights organization" and was "treated as a pariah even after
v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), aff d in part, vacated in part, and remanded
sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)); id. at *29 ("In our society, a burning
cross means intimidation.").
215. See id. at *15-16 (citing State v. TB.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 481-82 (Fla. 1995), which
upheld a Florida ban on cross burning that lacked an "intent to intimidate" limitation).
216. The rationality of the prima facie provision in the Virginia statute that the Court
struck down in Black was built around the assumptions that cross burning inherently
intimidates, one would not burn a cross for any reason other than to intimidate, and that
the combination of these two assumptions justifies eliminating, in effect, the factfinder's
obligation to scrutinize the entire context of the behavior to ascertain the true aim of the
act. See id. at *18 (arguing that "the act of burning a cross is typically... intended ... to
intimidate a victim").
217. Following the decision in Black, the Governor of Virginia stated, "I respect the
First Amendment protection of speech, but burning a cross is never about free speech."
Lyle Denniston, Court Rules Cross Burning Can Be Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2003,
at A2, available at 2003 WL 3389641. Even the Commonwealth's chief legal officer, its
attorney general, seems to reject that portion of the Black holding that cross burning
sometimes has only the intent to express a viewpoint. He is quoted as saying that "[a]
burning cross is a symbol like no other. It doesn't just say, 'We don't like you.' The
message is, 'We are going to do you harm."' Tony Mauro, Justices Say Intimidation Isn't
Free Speech, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at 9.
218. See Cross Burning Terrorizes Public, CAL. ST. U.-LONG BEACH U-WIRE, Apr. 9,
2003, 2003 WL 18646170 (reasoning that striking down Virginia's prima facie provision
was "a minor change" and merely "symbolic" because "[w]hy would someone with good
intentions burn a cross. .. [and n]o one is trying to enlighten anyone with cross burning..
. [because cross burning] has no message except that of hatred and terror"); The Free-
Speech Line, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Apr. 9, 2003, at 10A, available at 2003
WL 17913242 (stating its approval that government must prove intent to intimidate but
also concluding that "it is hard to imagine an instance in which a cross burning-a central
symbol to the Ku Klux Klan's violently racist ideology-could be benign"); see also Terror
Shouldn't Be Protected Under Freedom of Speech Rights, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Apr. 11, 2003, at 12A, available at 2003 WL 3497338 (concluding that "the burning cross..
• has been a symbol of fear, terror and intimidation" and accordingly, "[i]t's difficult to
imagine when a flaming cross would not be perceived as a threat").
219. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE
PERFORMATIVE 56-57 (1997) (criticizing the decision in R.A. V. on the ground that
because of the historical connection between cross burning and violence, "the burning
cross assumes the status of a direct ... threat").
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he won the case. 2 2 0 William Kunstler's explanation was that for "most
blacks and most white liberals ... [a]ll they could see was the burning
cross."22' The evidence suggests that one might recast that observation
and state that all they could see in the burning cross was the intent to
intimidate. Among jurors who do not acknowledge any other intent in
cross burning, defense counsel confront a nearly impossible task in
arguing for acquittal on the ground that the cross burner lacked the
requisite intent.
But the risk of jury nullification of the speech-protective aspects of
Black transcends the dangers arising from the widely held belief that one
only burns a cross to intimidate. The risk of jury nullification resides also
in the pathology of intolerance. Rodney Smolla has observed that
"[c]ensorship is a social instinct, 222 and "[tihe conflict felt by most decent
Americans is that we hate hate speech as much as we love free speech.,
2 3
Kenneth Karst has explained what happens when a cultural "outsider"
expresses an idea challenging our conventional orthodoxy or expresses
an idea through "modes of expression ... that go against the dominant
cultural grain., 224 Such expression generates
the most insistent demands for suppression of speech . . .
[because] challenges [to] a dominant community of meaning...
are bound to arouse strong emotions, for they threaten the
individual identities of the people who live inside the
boundaries of the dominant culture....
The subordination of outsiders [is] rooted in fear, and the
225fears come to us early.
This "aggressive impulse to be intolerant of others resides within all of
us," Vincent Blasi reminds US.226 "The problem [of aggressive
220. See HENTOFF, supra note 24, at xiv.
221. Id.
222. Jonathan Kirsch, Censorship: Hushing the Voices of Dissent, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1992, at E6, available at 1992 WL 2926169 (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH
IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992)).
223. Rodney A. Smolla, The Price of Free Speech, SUNDAY OREGONIAN (Portland),
June 28, 1992, at D1, available at 1992 WL 6843297.
224. Karst, supra note 130, at 97, 100.
225. Id. at 96, 110; see id. at 110 ("When we encounter people who have been
acculturated to assign different meanings to behavior, our lack of understanding may lead
us to mistrust them."); see also JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A READER 130 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that our commitment to freedom
of speech "'begin[s] to break down as the speech in question strikes more and more deeply
at the personal and social values we cherish and hold fundamental to the society"' and
concluding that protecting speech we detest thus constitutes an "'act[] of extraordinary
tolerance' (quoting LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986))).
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intolerance] is compounded by the fact that the suppression of dissent
ordinarily is undertaken in the guise of political affirmation, of insisting
that everyone stand up and be counted in favor of the supposed true
values of the political community. 22 7 Sustained socialization is required
to combat this urge to suppress dissent. But during what Blasi calls
"pathological" periods, times of great national distress, this socialization
tends to lose its effectiveness."" There develops a "notable shift in
attitudes regarding the tolerance of unorthodox ideas. ''129  During
"pathological periods, at least some of the central norms of the
constitutional regime are . . . scrutinized and challenged. The core
commitments that derive from those norms are viewed by many as highly
burdensome and controversial."'230 Blasi thus argues that because the
central norms of free expression "tend to be placed in jeopardy during
pathological periods .. . adjudication in ordinary times should be heavily
influenced by the goal of strengthening the central norms of the first
amendment tradition against the possibility of pathological challenges."
231
Juries dealing with criminal defendants in free speech cases are no
more immune from the social instinct to suppress dissent than the rest of
society. Akhil Reed Amar's work summarizes this reality well. Amar
argues that the First Amendment was drafted to protect "relatively
popular speech critical of unpopular government policies-the kind of
speech, for example, that the 1798 Sedition Act sought to stifle. 232 In
that context, the "paradigm speaker" was John Peter Zenger in colonial
New York who was "a popular publisher who wanted to get to a local
jury likely to be sympathetic to his anti-government message. ' ' 211 In more
226. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 457 (1985) (concluding that "[b]ecause the instinct to suppress dissent is
basic, primitive, and aggressive, it tends to have great momentum when it breaks loose
from the shackles of social constraint. Aggression is contagious, and hatred of strangers
for what they believe is one of the safest and most convenient forms of aggression.").
227. Id.
228. Id. at 450.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 456.
231. Id. at 458. Government officials may be a primary source of suppression of
speech. They
tend to overvalue short-term, concrete interests that conflict with allowing free
speech, and to undervalue the more abstract, long-term interests served by
speech. Free speech (assuming it does not involve the press) may be less well
defended by the kind of organized constituent groups that are effective in
influencing government officials. Free speech may tend to create disorder, and
officials might place undue emphasis on the need to maintain control.
David A. Strauss, Why Be Tolerant?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1485, 1498 (1986).
232. Amar, supra note 135, at 152.
233. Id. at 153.
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recent times, the "center of gravity" has shifted to protecting "unpopular,
eccentric, 'offensive' speech, and . . . speech critical not simply of
government policies, but also of prevailing social norms. ' ' 114 Now the
"paradigm speaker" seeking free speech protection is someone more like
the unpopular flag burner Gregory Johnson,235 the "cultural outsider
[who] challenge[s] head on the social order and general orthodoxy of
dominant public opinion., 23 6 As Amar concludes, "Gregory Johnson,
unlike popular John Peter Zenger, would not have been content to place
his fate in the hands of a jury of ordinary citizens" because jurors in cases
such as his view the government not as the oppressor but as "an honest
agent of dominant community morality.,
237
Ernst Freund has expressed parallel views showing how free speech is
a precarious right when "subject to a jury's guessing at motive." 238
Freund points out that "while the jury may have been a protection
against governmental power when the government was a thing apart
from the people, its checking function fails where government policies
are supported by majority opinion., 239 These are not new ideas. Fifty
years ago, Thomas Emerson warned that
[m]ost of our efforts in the past to formulate rules for limiting
freedom of expression have been seriously defective through
failure to take into consideration the realistic context in which
such limitations are administered. The crux of the problem is
that the limitations, whatever they may be, must be applied by
one group of human beings to other human beings. In order to
take adequate account of this factor it is necessary to have some
understanding of the forces in conflict, the practical difficulties[,
and] . . . the possibility of distorting [legal limitations and
protections] to attain ulterior purposes.
The starting point is a recognition of the powerful forces that
impel men toward the elimination of unorthodox expression...
234. Id. at 152-53.
235. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
236. Amar, supra note 135, at 153.
237. Id.
238. See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May
13, 1919, at 13, reprinted in Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund and the First Amendment
Tradition: Professor Ernst and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 240 (1973)
(concluding that "[t]o know what you may do and what you may not do, and how far you
may go ... is the first condition of political liberty; to be permitted to agitate at your own
peril, subject to a jury's guessing at motive, tendency and possible effect, makes the right
of free speech a precarious gift").
239. Id. at 241 (observing that when a docile jury finds an intent to intimidate, that
finding tends to be conclusive when the court "does not consider it inconsistent with
possibility").
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[T]he drives to repress, both irrational and rational, tend to
become overwhelming.240
The risk of jury nullification thus is inherent when "cultural outsiders"
such as cross burners are prosecuted. The risk can be exacerbated,
moreover, when prosecutors in a cross-burning trial are permitted to
introduce evidence implicitly inviting the jury to convict because of the
intimidating tendency of cross burning, notwithstanding a jury instruction
to the contrary. Virginia's brief in Black demonstrates how this strategy
might operate. Virginia stated that in the Barry Black case the jury
properly found a motive to intimidate, even though Black chose to burn
a cross on the land of another with permission of the land owner, because
Black did not do everything possible to prevent persons, other than
attendees at his rally, from observing the burning cross. He burned the
cross "in public view ... where passers-by could clearly see it," Virginia
argued, although he had the option of choosing a location for the cross
burning that "could not be seen from the roadside., 24 ' This choice of
location, Virginia urged, constitutes an indicia of intent to intimidate
when a secluded place was available.242  Moreover, Virginia introduced
evidence that Black chose a place to burn a cross that "was also clearly
visible from 8 to 10 nearby houses," one of which was close enough that
the person occupying the house "could hear Klan speakers 'talk real bad
about the blacks and the Mexicans.' ' 243 Virginia further contended that
additional evidence of the intent to intimidate could be found in the size
of the cross burned; the cross was twenty-five to thirty feet high, making
it "visible along a three-quarter mile stretch of state roadway, where cars
240. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 887 (1963).
The illuminating letters between Judge Learned Hand and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, discovered by Gerald Gunther over a quarter-century ago, further clarifies the
hazards of permitting a rule of legal responsibility for speech to turn on nothing more than
a jury's determination of motive. In a late March, 1919 letter from Judge Hand to Justice
Holmes, Judge Hand stated that free speech cases so often
actually occur when men are excited and since juries are especially clannish
groups,... it is very questionable whether the test of motive is not a dangerous
test. Juries won't much regard the difference between the probable result of the
words and the purposes of the utterer .... [This often] will serve to intimidate
[the speaker].
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 165 (1994).
241. Brief of Petitioner at 6, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107). In
the trial of Barry Black the prosecutors introduced photographs of "the open field where
the cross was burned and the long stretch of adjacent highway" [defining "adjacent" as 300
to 350 yards away] and photographs of "a secluded area [behind some trees] on the same
property where the Klan could have held its rally out of public view, without the
intimidating effect on passers-by." Id. n.3.
242. See id. at 6-7.
243. Id. at 6.
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passed at the rate of about 40 to 50 miles per hour.",2" All of this
evidence, introduced as probative of motive, also is calculated to
encourage the jury to convict if the jury finds the cross burning had the
tendency (likelihood) of intimidating- thus equating intent and
tendency. One need not guess that this is the strategy; Virginia
essentially concedes this when it states in its brief to the Court that
"while cross burning at a secluded Klan rally may intimidate no one,
there is intimidation when the cross is burned-as it was in Carroll
County-in a place visible to neighbors and passers-by. 2 45 Reinforcing
this strategy of equating tendency and intent is Virginia's argument
regarding the reaction of Black motorists who drove on the state highway
and observed the cross burning from afar. They "'stopped and looked
across the field' toward the burning cross, then 'took off at a higher than
normal rate of speed.' 246 The suggestion is that cross burning had the
tendency to intimidate these motorists, that those who intentionally burn
a cross where it could be observed from the highway knew or should
have known this would be the likely effect (tendency) of their behavior,
and, therefore, intimidation was their intent.
24 7
The above-described strategy for proving intent is pernicious. It tends
to encourage jurors to convict due to the likely effect of cross burning on
others, notwithstanding a jury instruction not to confuse tendency with
intent. The strategy restricts the constitutional right to proclaim a
viewpoint through cross burning in ways no other expression of
viewpoint is restricted. No constitutional principle permits the
government to penalize a speaker for choosing to express a point of view
248to those who do not currently accept its truth. If the right to free
expression means anything it means the right to participate in the public
debate by addressing nonbelievers with one's viewpoint. Yet Virginia's
strategy invites the jury to convict when a cross burner does just that. If
the cross burner chooses not to repair to a secluded place where none
other than believers can view the message of hate and White supremacy
expressed through ideological cross burning, the jury is invited to
consider this a reason to convict. Such a prosecutorial strategy impairs
244. Id.
245. Id. at 33 n.19.
246. Id. at 6.
247. Virginia implicitly conceded its strategy to establish the intent to intimidate by
demonstrating the tendency of cross burning to intimidate when it additionally argued to
the Court that "when the cross is burned ... at a Klan rally visible to all passers-by[,] ...
the incident is understood to be a threat against those minorities whom the Klan has
historically sought to cower." Id. at 36 n.21.
248. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (citation omitted).
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the freedom of expression Black purports to secure and encourages self-
censorship.
49
The judiciary needs to decide if it will take seriously the Court's
holding in Black that some cross burning is constitutionally protected
expression of viewpoint and also take seriously the duty to protect this
speech.250 If burning a cross in an open field with permission of the
owner can be stretched to evidence of an intent to intimidate, because
the burning could have been conducted at a more remote site, the state
strikes at viewpoints as effectively through statutes requiring an intent to
intimidate as through statutes that require no proof of such an intent. No
court ought to indulge such a prosecutorial strategy, at least no court that
is serious about honoring its oath to uphold the Constitution.
This is not to say that it is easy to accept Black's declaration that
expressions of hate and bigotry communicated through the medium of
cross burning deserve full constitutional protection: only that it is
necessary. It has been observed that "[t]he Supreme Court at work on
the First Amendment is not a pretty sight. Freedom of speech may be a
noble concept, but the actual stuff of such cases tends to be sordid."' 1 '
The famous Frankfurter quote, used to introduce this article, comes to
mind when we consider protecting viewpoints we despise: "It is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently
been forged in controversies involving not very nice people., 25 2 Yet we
know, as Harry Kalven, Jr. so persuasively urged many years ago,
"Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for all, we will
have it for none. It is a sign of weakness to control speech; only
democracies can afford the gallant gamble on utter freedom of speech-
it is too dangerous for tyranny.
253
249. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (concluding that "[t]he
existence of . . . a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion
that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview").
250. After all, the Court in Black refers to ideological cross burning as "core political
speech" and as "lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect." Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
251. Lawrence J. Siskind, The Right to Discomfit, THE RECORDER (San Francisco),
Apr. 25, 2003, WESTLAW, 4/25/2003 Recorder-SF 5.
252. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
253. Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
UCLA L. REV. 428, 432 (1967). Justice Black often urged the same idea. For example, in
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
(1961), Justice Black stated:
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech,
press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be
accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1
The above discussion of the pathology of intolerance suggests that it is
most unfortunate that the decision in Black permits a state to punish
cross burning on the property of another even when the owner or
occupier consents. It would have been better if the Court had held that
the Constitution commands what some states, such as Florida and
California, voluntarily do-exempt from criminal proscription the
burning of a cross on the property of another with permission of the
owner or occupier of the premises. This single limitation in a state's
cross-burning statute would remove most of the risk of unconstitutional
criminal conviction of ideological cross burners. 5 As one amicus curiae
brief in Black pointed out: "[L]inking criminal culpability with
unauthorized access to property limits the circumstances under which a
prosecution can be initiated. Thus, the potential of the statute reaching
protected expression is greatly reduced."
25 6
Even when states do not so limit the reach of their cross-burning
statutes, courts should find, as a matter of constitutional law, that cross
burning at a Ku Klux Klan or similar political rally, is constitutionally
protected.257  Dicta in the opinion of the Court in Black goes far in
adopting this view. Justice O'Connor's opinion states that "sometimes
the cross burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity.
It is a ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the Klan
itself. Thus, '[b]urning a cross at a political rally would almost certainly
be protected expression.'
2 18
we cherish. The first banning of an association because it advocates hated
ideas-whether that association be called a political party or not-marks a
fateful moment in the history of a free country.
Id. at 137 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Texas, v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989)
(stating that the degree of tolerance we show to offensive speech is a "reaffirmation of the
principles of freedom and inclusiveness ... and of the conviction that our toleration ... is
a sign and source of our strength... [and] resilience").
254. Florida law contains this limitation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.18 (West 2000)
(banning cross burning on the property of another "without first obtaining written
permission of the owner or occupier of the premises"). Under California law, the same
restriction applies. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11411(c) (West 2000); see also People v. Steven
S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
255. The risk would still exist for those who burn a cross on public property.
256. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 31085675, at
*19.
257. See Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648 (holding that cross burning at a rally is
protected because it is not directed at any individual).
258. Black, 538 U.S. at 365-66 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,402 n.4 (White, J., concurring)).
It is of course possible that cross burners may burn a cross at a rally with the aim of
intimidating others rather than to express a viewpoint. That seldom would be the case, as
Justice O'Connor concluded in Black. To the extent that the proposed rule would create
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The reforms urged above will go far in avoiding distorted fact finding
that results in punishing protected speech. One additional protection is
needed: active participation by the judiciary in reviewing findings that
cross burning was engaged in with the intent to intimidate. The specter
that causes alarm is that of a zealous prosecutor indicting, of an obliging
jury convicting, and of a pliant trial and appellate court rendering a jury
finding of intent to intimidate "conclusive because the court does not
consider it inconsistent with possibility. 2 59 Henry Monaghan has made
the case persuasively that courts "must exercise independent judgment"
with respect to constitutional facts relevant to First Amendment law
application.2 6 As he explains, "[Bloth trial and appellate judges must
examine the evidence, marshal the relevant adjudicative facts, and then
apply the controlling first amendment norms to those facts., 261  Such
judicial oversight is needed to avoid "an intolerable level of mistakes in
denial of first amendment defenses ',262  caused either by the
indeterminacy of a particular First Amendment rule or the more
disquieting risk of "systemic bias [brought about or threatened] by other
actors in the judicial system., 263  This preference for active judicial
oversight arises from a deep-seated belief that long judicial tenure
insulates judges from political pressure, that courts are more
institutionally detached from other actors, that judges are acculturated to
decide cases according to legal rules, and that these forces increase the
likelihood that judges will take the "long view." 264
an unacceptable risk that intended intimidation goes unpunished, courts might need to
design a narrow exception to the proposed rule of protecting cross burning at a political
rally. Black suggests that a possible exception would be that cross burning at a political
rally would not be protected if "a cross burning is directed at a particular person not
affiliated with the Klan [for then] the burning cross often serves as a message of
intimidation, designed to inspire in the victim a fear of bodily harm." Id. at 357 ("The
person who bums a cross directed at a particular person often is making a serious threat,
meant to coerce ....").
259. See Freund, supra note 238, at 241.
260. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 229
(1985) (extrapolating from the defamation case, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, 466 U.S. 485, 513-14 (1984), the general principle that "as a matter of
'federal constitutional law,' appellate courts [are not bound by the 'clearly erroneous'
standard set forth in FRCP Rule 52(a) but] must exercise independent judgment and
determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity [not just
preponderance of the evidence]").
261. Id.
262. Id. at 269.
263. Id. at 271.
264. See GARVEY & SCHAUER, supra note 225, at 275.
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VI. THE FUTURE OF FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AFTER BLACK
One of the more remarkable aspects of Black is the relatively casual
way the Court announces that cross burning can have two quite distinct
purposes, one ideological and one to threaten, and that the ideological
purpose is constitutionally protected even though the ideology asserted
centers on hate, bigotry, and racial superiority.26 ' The understated way in
which all this is expressed in Black demonstrates that First Amendment
doctrine has come a long way from the regime of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire266 and Beauharnais v. Illinois267 when the Court placed beyond
constitutional protection "words . . . which by their very utterance inflict
injury. ',261
This evolution from the Chaplinsky era is all the more remarkable
when one realizes that the hateful viewpoints the First Amendment now
is understood to protect have been characterized as constituting an
assault that profoundly injures the psyche of its victims- "like receiving a
slap in the face., 269 The flag burning cases (Texas v. Johnson270 and
United States v. Eichman2 7 1 ) showed that the expression of unpopular
symbolic expression was protected, but these cases did not resolve
whether a viewpoint can so injure an individual or group that it loses
constitutional protection. But the seeds of the contemporary protection
of all ideology, even the ideology of hate, can be found in those cases,
especially in the bedrock principle articulated in Johnson.272 R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul took that bedrock principle a step beyond Johnson by
265. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003).
266. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
267. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
268. Id. at 255-56; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. This "two-level" theory of speech, as
Harry Kalven termed it, emanates from dicta in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais. Kenneth
Karst explains that as early as 1960, Kalven destroyed its intellectual foundations by
demonstrating that placing speech beyond the protection of the First Amendment because
it lacks redeeming social utility "violates the first amendment principle that prohibits
weighing the social utility of speech." Karst, supra note 104, at 30-31 (citing Harry Kalven,
Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10 (1960)).
269. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452 (1990). Frederick Schauer has observed, however,
that
a host of communicative acts [can] indeed hurt us....
The capacity of speech to cause injury in diverse ways contends with the goal
of strong free speech (and free press) protection, and . . . robust free speech
systems protect speech not because it is harmless, but despite the harm it may
cause.
Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1992).
270. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
271. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
272. See discussion supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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deploying it to protect even racist viewpoints. Akhil Amar reminds us
that R.A.V. did not simply restate past law; it "remodel[ed]" it.274 In
R.A.V, the Court acknowledged that "the Court's prior descriptions of





Now, after Black, we can say with assurance that it also is not "literally
true" that the Constitution provides no protection to "words 'which by
their very utterance inflict injury.' ', 76 It is equally certain, however, that
Black did not strike entirely the words-which-by-their-very-utterance-
inflict-injury category from the Chaplinsky list of unprotected speech."'
The category survives but with what effect after Black?
It seems clear that speech will not fall outside the First Amendment's
protection by operation of Chaplinsky's words-which-by-their-very-
utterance-inflict-injury category simply because the idea (the viewpoint)
contained in those words may "inflict injury." If Johnson's bedrock
principle, as well as the holdings in R.A. V. and Black, mean nothing else,
they mean that.278 But, the words-which-by-their-very-utterance-inflict-
injury category might still serve as a source of governmental authority to
control the words used to express viewpoints of hate and bigotry. That,
after all, is the whole point of the fighting words doctrine, for example.
The viewpoint is protected, but the means of conveying it (the words
employed) may be subject to proscription.2 79 The Court's choice in Black
to rely on the "particularly virulent" exception to R.A. V. could revitalize
Chaplinsky in the sense that government might attempt to deploy the
exception to justify banning certain words, such as racial epithets, from
the public vocabulary while protecting the viewpoint these words
express.
Protecting the viewpoint but banning the words deployed to express it
is risky business. That is the teaching of Cohen v. California.s5 It is the
273. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992).
274. See Amar, supra note 135, at 147.
275. Id. (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383).
276. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
277. As it had done previously in R.A.V., see 505 U.S. at 383, the Court in Black
reaffirmed the Chaplinsky dictum regarding the absence of constitutional protection
accorded words that "'by their very utterance inflict injury."' Id. (quoting Chaplinsky, 215
U.S. at 572).
278. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (stating that "the First Amendment 'ordinarily'
denies a State 'the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political
doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil
consequence" (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927)).
279. See CLEARY, supra note 156, at 167 (stating that the fighting words doctrine
"created a Pandora's box for freedom of speech because it held that words that led to a
reflexive and violent response from a target could be punished").
280. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Catholic University Law Review
Cohen decision that most eloquently rejects state efforts to remove
particular words from the public discourse.18 ' A way to test whether
Black might provide sustenance to state efforts to censor words because
they "inflict injury" is to investigate whether Black undermines Cohen.
A plausible case can be made that it does.
Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen stands as a bulwark against what we
would call today, "political correctness." It rejected California's attempt
to "punish[] public utterance[s] .. .in order to maintain ... a suitable
level of discourse within the body politic. ' 28 2 Two of the bases for the
Court's refusal in Cohen to allow California to prohibit Cohen from
using the words he chose to use to express his opposition to the war in
Vietnam are particularly apropos to an inquiry into Black's effect on
Cohen.
California opened by asserting its right to prohibit Cohen from
communicating his distaste for the war in Vietnam by placing "F--k
the draft" on the back of his jacket by arguing that it had an obligation to
283protect against the violent reactions this might cause in others. Justice
Harlan dispatched that argument quickly with two rhetorical swipes.
First, there was no evidence that "substantial numbers of citizens are
standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen."284 Moreover, to
permit the state to regulate based on such an unproved risk of reactive
violence would permit the state to indulge in "an 'undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression.'
28 5
California's second ground was that, in any event, it had the right "as
guardian[] of [the] public morality [to] remove [Cohen's] offensive word
from the public vocabulary."286 It is here where we first were taught by
the Court that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. '27  This is because "much linguistic expression . . .
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication,
but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well."' ' The government cannot
be granted the leave it requests because, first, the power sought is
281. Id. at 16, 26 (holding that California could not prohibit wearing a jacket
containing the words "F-- k the draft").
282. Id. at 23.
283. Id. at 22-23.
284. Id. at 23.
285. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
286. Id. at 22-23.
287. Id. at 26.
288. Id.
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"inherently boundless."' 289 When one considers that "one man's vulgarity
is another's lyric, '' 290 one soon realizes that "governmental officials
cannot make principled distinctions in this area [and for this reason,] the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style . . . largely to the
individual., 291  In addition, to grant California's request to prohibit
certain words to achieve a "suitable level of discourse" 292 is to "indulge
the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process [for]
governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as
a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.
293
If Black erodes the speech-protective coating Cohen provides, it will
be with respect to one or more of the above-stated arguments in Justice
Harlan's decision.
The "particularly virulent" exception to R.A.V. is undifferentiated fear
in different clothing. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,9 the armband was said to be inherently likely to disrupt
the classroom. 9 In Cohen and Johnson, the behaviors were said to be
inherently likely to create reactive violence. 96 In Black the cross burning
was said to be inherently likely to intimidate, and in a "particularly
virulent" way.297 In Tinker, Cohen, and Johnson, the government was not
permitted to regulate the content of speech based on such assertions of
the speech being "inherently likely" to create adverse social effects.2
98
Black breaks that otherwise consistent pattern. If government is
permitted to assert that a burning cross can inherently intimidate, indeed
"virulently" intimidate, why is government not also permitted to assert
that certain racial epithets, for example, inherently intimidate (or
inherently create other outcomes that a state should be privileged to
protect against)? Cross burning does have a unique history of
association with violence, as the Court emphasized.299 But if Black
develops to permit selective proscription of other symbols, which have a
less certain association with threats of violence, then censoring
expressive symbols could evolve into the censoring of words. As
289. Id. at 25,
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 23.
293. Id. at 26.
294. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
295. See id. at 508.
296. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1989); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22-23.
297. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,363 (2003).
298. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see discussion supra notes 94, 293 and accompanying text;
see also notes 232-42 and accompanying text.
299. Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.
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respondents in Black remind us, "A word is, after all, but a symbol
itself. ,, 3°
But what of Justice Harlan's second line of defense of free speech in
Cohen-that the power of government to pick and choose which words
to permit or prohibit seems "inherently boundless" because one "cannot
make principled distinctions in this area" and because one should not
indulge in the "facile assumption" that this can be done without "running
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas" as well?30' Does Black erode that
principle? It would seem the answer is a resounding "yes" unless one
believes that there are significantly more "principled distinctions"
available to government officials when deciding which expressive
symbols are "particularly virulent" than there would have been available
to California officials choosing which words to ban in order to protect the
public morality. If, after reading the above discussion in Part IV, one
concludes that this new "particularly virulent" exception to R.A.V.
"seems inherently boundless," then one also ought to worry that
permitting such an operating principle to insinuate itself into First
Amendment doctrine may well inaugurate an erosion of Cohen.302
One final thought on the potentially corrosive effects of Black on
established principles for protecting expression: Conspicuously absent
from the prerequisites for constitutional proscription of cross burning is
any requirement that the cross burning must not only be intended to
intimidate but also that imminent intimidation is likely to occur in the
circumstances.3 3 Until Black, the Court seemed to equivocate regarding
whether in "true threat" cases a state must prove that it is likely that a
300. Brief on Merits for Respondents at 11, Black (No. 01-1107).
301. See discussion supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
302. Punishing speech because the words used cause emotional harm in the audience
takes the regulation of expression into a realm far beyond the fighting words doctrine.
The concept of breach of the peace is fairly contained-inherently likely to provoke an
imminent hostile response in the person to whom the words individually are addressed.
See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972). But a rule banning words that
"inflict injury" refers to an internal condition that lacks fixed objective meaning and defies
agreement regarding which words threaten that interest. As Mark Rutzick has explained,
the "inflict injury" standard
creates a ... difficult evaluative problem for those wishing to incorporate it into
the law's protected interests. Unlike the more tangible quality of order, the
interest of protecting "sensibilities" has no physical component. The only
manner in which a individual's "sensibilities" are known to be affected is by the
individual's statement to that effect.
Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1974).
303. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
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threat will produce an imminent fear of harm."4 On its face, the decision
in Black contains no such express requirement. The decision in Black
thus raises the question of whether the decision retreats from the normal
requirement that government must show that proscribed speech creates a
"clear and present danger" of substantial harm.3 °5
In the Black litigation, Virginia argued that there is no constitutional
requirement in cross-burning cases that a state prove that an intended
intimidation actually creates the likelihood of placing another in
imminent fear.3"6 Virginia conceded that under the fighting words
doctrine, a state must establish that the words spoken are likely to create
the risk of imminent reactive violence, but cross burning, it urged, is
different. As Virginia argued, "Hurling an epithet may sometimes
provoke a breach of the peace in the heat of the moment, but the danger
is likely soon to pass [and if it does not create a likelihood of an
imminent reactive violence it probably will not result in any harm at
all]. 30 7  However, "[i]t is different with intimidation. A threat to do
bodily harm to an individual or his family is likely to sink deep into the
psyche of its victim, acquiring more force over time. . . . 'The value of a
sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it drops.""'3 8 This reasoning
may explain why the Court jettisoned "imminent" from the normal
requirements for finding criminal culpability arising from speech. This
argument does not explain, however, the absence of any discussion in
304. In dicta, the Court in early cases had signaled that threats may be regulated even
absent proof of such a likelihood. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705, 707
(1969) (stating in dicta that federal statute prohibiting an intentional threat against the life
of thc President is constitutional). Yet, the holdings of other, more recent, threat cases are
grounded in the government's failure to prove that a threat was likely to produce
imminent harm. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1987) (holding that
the discharge from public employment due to private expression of desire that the next
assassination attempt on President Reagan be successful was unlawful absent evidence
that the speaker intended and is able to take action consistent with her expressed desire);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982) (overturning civil
damage award arising from threat because "[s]trong and effective extemporaneous
rhetoric" implying "an unlawful form of discipline" and creating "a fear of violence" not
sufficient to "remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment" absent
evidence the speech is likely to cause any harm). See generally Steven G. Gey, The
Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEx. L. REV. 541, 552 &
552 n.65 (2000) (discussing the failure of lower courts to apply the holding of Claiborne
Hardware in cases of alleged threats).
305. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
306. See Brief of Petitioner, Black (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898, at *14-15 (stating
that "[s]o long as there is an intent to intimidate, all acts of cross burning are banned. All
are subject to the same punishment.").
307. Id. at *14.
308. Id. (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 530 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring)).
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Black of why the Virginia statute was upheld although, on its face, it does
not require proof that the cross burning done with the intent to
intimidate will likely place one in fear of bodily harm-albeit not
imminent bodily harm.3 9
Strict judicial scrutiny requires that the government show a necessity to
interfere with the enjoyment of a constitutional right.3"0 In free speech
doctrine, the "clear" requirement in the "clear and present danger"
paradigm responds to that imperative. It provides assurance that the
government is justified in suppressing speech because the speech is
creating (or is likely to create) a substantial evil justifying government
• • 311
intervention. In other words, the likelihood requirement is
constitutional law's way of saying that no criminal culpability can attach
when speech creates no danger of a concrete injury. That is the whole
point of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company.1 2
A prohibition on true threats is said to protect against several different
types of injury. It "'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence' and
'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting
people 'from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. ,,313
None of these interests are implicated when a threat creates no
reasonable likelihood of creating a risk that one will be put in fear of
bodily harm. One can imagine, for example, a federal prisoner, housed
in a maximum security prison for the remainder of his life, threatening
the life of the President in a letter sent to the White House. None of the
evils identified by the Court are likely to arise from a threat that cannot
be effectuated. Similarly, what if, in the Black case, O'Mara and Elliott
had retrieved the cross they lighted after it had extinguished itself a short
time after it was lighted, and James Jubilee never discovered that a cross
had been burned on his property? Could these cross burners
nevertheless have been prosecuted lawfully for cross burning with the
intent to intimidate?
The answer appears to be no. Virginia conceded in Black that Virginia
law does not explicitly require proof of likelihood of harm because "[i]n
Virginia criminal law, 'intimidation' means acts that put the victim 'in
309. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
310. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 637 (1969).
311. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (holding that regulation of the
content of speech requires proof that the "substantive evil [is] extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished").
312. 458 U.S. 886. 929 (1982); see discussion supra note 304.
313. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (alteration in original) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
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fear of bodily harm.' 3,1 4  In other words, at least in Virginia, the
"likelihood" requirement is built into the Commonwealth's definition of
"intimidation." Because of this local definition of intimidation, it was
unnecessary for the Court in Black to address the question of what if
intimidation had not been so defined."' The above discussion strongly
suggests that the Virginia definition of "intimidation" is constitutionally
mandated. Otherwise, Black spawns the remarkable First Amendment
principle that the content of speech can be proscribed even when it
creates no likelihood of harm-not a precedent the Court would introduce
sub silentio.
VII. CONCLUSION
For those inclined to view Black as a sound compromise
accommodating the competing legitimate interests that cross burning
implicates, the above discussion should prove revealing. I have shown
why the decision deserves at least honorable mention in any contest
selecting noteworthy efforts to formulate speech-protective First
Amendment principles. But Black also is worrisome. Embedded in its
reasoning are fault lines that could grow into fissures and then chasms
weakening hard-fought protections against government-sponsored
imposition of orthodoxy. One example is the Court's willingness in
Black to employ the rather open-ended "particularly virulent" exception
to avoid the R.A.V. ban on content discrimination. Even if cross burning
is, as the Court concludes, a particularly virulent form of intimidation,
can permitting selective regulation of speech on this basis be cabined?
The political pressures will be inexorable to expand the exception to
other powerful expressive symbols. Another troubling consequence of
the holding in Black is the continuing opportunities available to
prosecutors, judges, and juries to punish cross burning lacking any intent
to intimidate. This concern is exacerbated if, as the evidence suggests,
many remain convinced that cross burning has but one intent-to
intimidate. Moreover, "cultural outsiders," such as cross burners, are
particularly vulnerable to the pathology of intolerance. Acting out this
314. See Brief of Petitioner, Black (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898, at *13 & n.6
(quoting Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 751 (2001) (Hassell, J., dissenting), affd
in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)).
315, The Court may also have concluded it need not address the requirement of
government proving a likelihood that cross burning will be placing another in fear of
physical harm because of the definition of intent it adopted. "'True threats,"' the Court
concluded, "encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals." Black, 538 U.S. at 359. There can be no "serious
expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence" when effectuating the threat
clearly is not possible.
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intolerance, juries too easily can foil Black's central holding that
ideological cross burning can be a constitutionally protected form of free
expression. If the Court is serious about protecting the ideological act of
cross burning, it will need to protect that act with safeguards, such as
those discussed above, that are calculated to address the forces that
continue to threaten to skew the adjudicatory process in the direction of
punishment.
The bitter irony of erosions of free speech protections, fashioned with
the best of intentions to protect minorities and the powerless, is the long
history of their use to suppress the dissent of the very persons intended
to be protected.316 Justice Black's dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois
3 "
captures this reality stunningly. With a few interlineations, it is a fitting
epitaph to Virginia v. Black. Justice Black warned:
No rationalization on a purely legal level can conceal the fact
that state laws like this one present a constant overhanging
threat to freedom of speech .... Moreover, the same kind of
state law that makes [one] a criminal for advocating segregation
[through the mechanism of burning a cross] can be utilized to
send people to jail in other states for [employing expressive
symbols to] advocat[e] equality and nonsegregation....
If there be minority groups who hail this holding as their
victory, they might consider the possible relevancy of this
ancient remark: 'Another such victory and I am undone.'
318
316. See CLEARY, supra note 156, at 209 (stating that "'the majority will most often
seek to regulate the speech of the politically powerless . . . [i]f an idea is unpopular, the
only thing that may protect it from the majority is a constitutional norm of content
neutrality') (quoting David Cole, Neutral Standards and Racist Speech, 2
RECONSTRUCTION 1, 68 (1992)); Amar, supra note 135, at 154-55 (arguing that if
"African-Americans and other minorities look[ed] beyond the alleged facts of R.A.V.
[they would] understand that the ordinance posed a threat to their freedom as well. They
too-indeed they especially ... should be wary of government censorship, and all the more
so when that censorship is selective"); Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the
Imperative of Progress: Lessons for the Post-Brown Era, 46 VAND. L. REV. 865. 873 (1993)
(demonstrating that "First Amendment history indicates a tendency to transform minority
protective rules into methodologies that consolidate the dominant group's advantage").
See generally Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 507-20 (1990) (citing studies showing that speech-restrictive doctrines
are used disproportionately against racial and ethnic minorities as evidenced in lower
court application of the fighting words doctrine, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and group defamation laws).
317. 343 U.S. 250, 274-75 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
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